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Executive Summary

THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

for the
Institute for National Security Studies

by
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This paper examines the Taiwanese Independence Movement from a political, cultural and social perspective. It proposes that Taiwan is already a *de facto* independent state: it has a distinct population, a governing system, clearly defined territory, a highly developed economic system and independent international relations. The argument over the island's status pertains to the question of a *de jure* declaration of independence. If, how, and when this formal declaration will occur, or if, how and when Taiwan will become a part of a Greater China including the mainland is the central issue, and of utmost concern to US policy in the Pacific Region.

One's view of the "Taiwanese Independence Movement" as an organized socio-political activity determines to a great extent one's political alignment in the rapidly changing Taiwanese system. Many of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party see the movement as a political ploy by opposition parties (the main one being the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) meant to promote a subculture of "victims" and stir up emotional resentment against the KMT, thereby increasing the opposition's share of voters. One could also analyze the movement as led by a set of intellectuals redefining and arguing over terms such as "Chinese People" and "Nation," calling on the uneducated masses to wake up to their "Taiwaneseness" and revolt against the current regime's definition of reality. This could be seen as carrying on a Chinese tradition in which an educated elite use the power of language to create and sustain an ideological movement calling the masses to action.

On the other hand, advocates of the independence movement see the movement as a part of the wider trend of democratization, nationalism and a distinct "people" yearning for self-determination. They regard the KMT of the past, and indeed all previous external ruling regimes, as foreign occupiers denying the Taiwanese people their rights to self-government. They can easily point to a repressive KMT regime that tolerated no words or actions suggesting that Taiwan is an independent island with an indigenous culture and people. International events, in which Taiwan's political status as the Republic of China has steadily eroded under great pressure from a steadily strengthening mainland China, combined with internal democratic, social, and economic developments have led many Taiwanese, with or without the help of an educated elite, to a greater consciousness of their status as an independent entity faced with a struggle for political survival. The result evident in surveys is a greater self-identification of the populace as "Taiwanese" versus "Chinese," and open debate about how to best deal with the threat from across the strait. Recent splintering of radical pro-independence advocates away from more moderate opposition party members demonstrates that the debate rages not only between independence and unification advocates, but also between differing pro-independence factions as well.

Both sides of the independence-unification debate present their own unique interpretation of history, of political and cultural terms, and of ethnic identification. In this report, I briefly discuss my method of inquiry into the problem: a combination of attitude survey results (including my own), interviews of political and intellectual elite, and research of secondary sources. I then present Taiwanese history, noting the conflicting views, particularly describing international and internal events since the 1970s affecting the rise of the Independence Movement. The following section introduces a theoretical framework to better understand Taiwanese society, expounding on the concepts of nation, state, political community, political culture, cultural identity and political legitimacy. The fourth section applies that framework using my findings from surveys, secondary literature, and elite interviews. The final section explores the significance of the Independence Movement in relation to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and United States policy in the Pacific region.

After careful investigation into this topic, I conclude that most Taiwanese, perhaps because of cultural background, seem to seek peace, harmony and stability in relationships--the building of a specifically Taiwanese national identity separate from China is largely an ideological concept that is unlikely to be supported by the majority of practical-minded Taiwanese. However, democratization in Taiwan, as well as economic development and the growth of a wealthy middle class, will create increasingly divergent societies across the Straits. The Independence Movement, now mostly represented by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other splinter groups, has slowly but steadily gained popularity and legitimacy, particularly in the recent rapid democratization in Taiwan. Supporters of formal independence include societal elements not presently politically powerful, such as the lower-income class, an intellectual elite, and opposition politicians seeking to use social discontent to secure votes. Pro-independence citizens are still in the minority, and will likely remain so for some time, especially in the face of military threats from Mainland China. Although the newly wealthy middle class and business interests in Taiwan do not seem to favor independence at this time, preferring stability in all international relationships, neither

will they accept reunification with an oppressive Communist regime. Polls show a steady percentage (about 17%) solidly supporting unification, while the number supporting independence, or willing to consider it, has increased recently. Perhaps what keeps more Taiwanese from supporting the Independence Movement is mostly the threat of invasion from the Mainland and the perception that Taiwan would be ruined either in a takeover or in the resistance attempt. If the perception should change that Taiwan could be militarily strong enough to declare independence (perhaps with the perception that the US would militarily support Taiwan), and if the Mainland continues to be run by authoritarian regimes, perhaps that middle class will support independence.

Nationalism—a fervent, emotional appeal to unite a people through a common language, culture, ethnicity, or through the state creation of other bonds—is becoming increasingly important in the entire region. Nationalism can work either for reunification of Mandarin speaking Chinese seeking a “Greater China,” or for independence of an increasingly divergent political culture on Taiwan. Polls on cultural identity show that most Taiwanese have a strong sense of Chinese identity and hence feel connected to the Mainland; however, identity as Taiwanese has increased recently as well, particularly in reaction to an aggressive PRC policy. The political culture and cultural identity of Taiwanese is presently undergoing rapid transformation, probably linked to both economic and political changes. The leaders on both sides of the Straits may use nationalism to boost their support as they face difficulties at home. Lee Teng-hui must deal with a powerful, vocal opposition, and Jiang Zemin faces difficulty with the military and a power struggle after Deng passes away. They are both likely to use nationalist rhetoric and less likely to compromise on either the position of winning international recognition and prestige for Taiwan (though this is short of independence for now), or maintaining authoritarian political order while developing economically for Mainland China. Particularly in communist China’s case, we may not expect entirely “rational” approaches from an international perspective, if belligerence against Taiwan is seen to bolster Jiang’s image.

The PRC has reacted to the independence movement with increasing nationalist rhetoric. It has not changed its position on Taiwan independence, considering it an internal matter of national sovereignty, and in fact has taken an increasingly tough stance on the matter, perhaps due to increasing influence of the hard-line PLA in PRC domestic politics. The use of military exercises and threats, including the firing of live ammunition in close proximity to the island, constitutes a dangerous heightening of tension. The possibility of shots fired in anger between the two sides increases with each exercise held by the Communists.

The US should be concerned over this situation of heightening tension over Taiwanese independence, yet should support the democratic changes going on in Taiwan. We should maintain our stance of letting the two sides work out the matter among themselves, but we have an overwhelming interest in preventing the outbreak of hostilities, due to key economic ties with Taiwan and the PRC and to the US interest in maintaining regional stability (e.g. the implications for North and South Korea). The most likely outbreak of hostilities involves a Mainland invasion of Taiwan. In order to prevent this from happening, we should support the continuing democratic process and economic growth in Taiwan, without specifically supporting an independence movement. The US should also encourage engagement between the Mainland and Taiwan, through economic and other ties. However, we must make it extremely clear to Mainland China that we will not tolerate an invasion of Taiwan, that we will honor our obligations in the Taiwan Relations Act, and that we will promote our interest in maintaining peace, stability, and democratic governments in the region. A tough stance now lessens the possibility of actually having to use force later, as the assurance of US aid during an invasion of Taiwan should make the potential cost much too high for Communist leaders contemplating an invasion. This requires a delicate balance, however, in which we do not encourage a radical independence movement with promises of military aid that would surely provoke an attack from the Mainland.

Nonetheless, we should recognize the reality of one of the world’s most complex political situations: Taiwan is an independent, sovereign nation with a clearly defined population, territory, political and economic system, and military. At some point in the future, it may reunite with the Mainland to form a Greater China, or it may decide to continue as an independent island nation. The current transformation of the identity of the people on Taiwan makes this future unclear, but the US as a matter of principle and practicality should respect the will of the Taiwanese population and not abandon them to the whims of Beijing. Continued or increased arms sales to Taiwan and support for international recognition will promote US interests in preserving Taiwan as a democratic, capitalist-market ally and model for Chinese economic and political development.

THE TAIWANESE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

A REPORT FOR THE
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES



30 September, 1996



by Robert L Cummings Jr, Maj (Sel), USAF

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WHAT INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT—ISN'T TAIWAN A COUNTRY?

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WHAT INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT—ISN'T TAIWAN A COUNTRY?

De Facto and De Jure Independence

When exploring the issue of the "Taiwanese Independence Movement," one is immediately confronted with a perplexing problem. In the middle of my first public presentation on this topic last December, an experienced colleague in the USAFA History Department interrupted my speech with an honest and understandable query, "Isn't Taiwan already independent?" With many products in the American market stamped "Made in Taiwan," with the recent cross-strait tensions over Taiwan's direct presidential election accompanied by threatening missile firings from the PRC grabbing international headlines, and even with dramatic ping pong contests between the PRC and Taiwan, the misinterpretation of the status of an "independent" Taiwan seems inevitable. Indeed, this confusion over Taiwan's "independence" is not the sole domain of foreigners—the issue of Taiwan's status is presently under debate in the political realm, and perhaps to a lesser extent the social realm, on Taiwan. Almost all sides tend to agree that Taiwan is already a *de facto* independent state: it has a distinct population, a governing system, clearly defined territory, a highly developed economic system and independent international relations. The argument over the island's status pertains to the question of a *de jure* declaration of independence (which to some would mean little more than a change of name). If, how, and when this formal declaration will occur, or if, how and when Taiwan will become a part of a Greater China including the mainland is the central issue, and of utmost concern to US policy in the Pacific Region.

One's view of the "Taiwanese Independence Movement" as an organized socio-political activity determines to a great extent one's political alignment in the rapidly changing Taiwanese system. Many of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party see the movement as a political ploy by opposition parties (the main one being the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) meant to promote a subculture of "victims" and stir up emotional resentment against the KMT, thereby increasing the opposition's share of voters. One could also analyze the movement as led by a set of intellectuals redefining and arguing over terms such as "Chinese People" and "Nation," "國家," calling on the uneducated masses to wake up to their "Taiwaneseness" and revolt against the current regime's definition of reality. This could be seen as carrying on a Chinese tradition in which an educated elite use the power of language to create and sustain an ideological movement calling the masses to action.

On the other hand, advocates of the independence movement see the movement as a part of the wider trend of democratization, nationalism and a distinct "people" yearning for self-determination. They regard the KMT of the past, and indeed all previous external ruling regimes, as foreign occupiers denying the Taiwanese people their rights to self-government. They can easily point to a repressive KMT regime that tolerated no words or actions suggesting that Taiwan is an independent island with an indigenous culture and people. International events, in which Taiwan's political status as the Republic of China has steadily eroded under great pressure from a steadily strengthening mainland China, combined with internal democratic, social, and economic developments have led many Taiwanese, with or without the

help of an educated elite, to a greater consciousness of their status as an independent entity faced with a struggle for political survival. The result evident in surveys is a greater self-identification of the populace as "Taiwanese" versus "Chinese," and open debate about how to best deal with the threat from across the strait. Recent splintering of radical pro-independence advocates away from more moderate opposition party members demonstrates that the debate rages not only between independence and unification advocates, but also between differing pro-independence factions as well.

Both sides of the independence-unification debate present their own unique interpretation of history, of political and cultural terms, and of ethnic identification. In this report I shall briefly present Taiwanese history, noting the conflicting views, particularly describing international and internal events since the 1970s affecting the rise of the Independence Movement. The following section introduces a theoretical framework to better understand Taiwanese society, followed by a section applying that framework using my findings from surveys, secondary literature, and elite interviews. Included is my summarization and analysis of the results of my own attitude survey concerning Political Attitudes, Political Culture, and Political Legitimacy, as well as of other surveys dealing with these subjects. The final section explores the significance of the Independence Movement in relation to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and United States policy in the Pacific region.

After careful investigation into this topic, I conclude that most Taiwanese, perhaps because of cultural background, seem to seek peace, harmony and stability in relationships—the building of a specifically Taiwanese national identity separate from China is largely an ideological concept that is unlikely to be supported by the majority of practical-minded Taiwanese. Most Taiwanese still see themselves, "in their hearts" as several expressed to me, as ethnically Chinese, although they might readily add an element of being ethnically Taiwanese as well in a culturally homogenous mix. However, as Taiwan continues to develop economically, meanwhile receiving significant western political ideological influence, and if a declaration of independence is seen as a safe alternative (or only alternative for survival) that will not severely disrupt regional harmony, then one can expect the establishment of a *de jure* Republic of Taiwan, in the distant future. The current US position that officially looks for peaceful unification negotiated by the two sides should take into consideration the complexity of the situation; as a matter of principle and practicality, we should not ignore the legitimate desire for a democratic and *de facto* independent Taiwanese people.

METHODOLOGY

The attempt to form a new nation is a tricky process involving many elements, including: reinterpreting a "national" history; changing a population's sense of identity through education, propaganda, media; and dealing with the practicalities of political process, economics, and military strength. Exploring this process thus requires a complex approach that not only analyzes intellectual and political elite attitudes and actions regarding the independence movement, but that also attempts to understand the less tangible sense of identity among the population.² My research activities consisted of developing and conducting a random sample survey of political and cultural attitudes, interviewing political figures and college professors, and translating and reading secondary source materials. My survey and research into other survey results shed some light onto the recent changes in Taiwanese political attitudes, cultural identity, and attitude toward independence and nation-building; the interviews, study of official pronouncements and policy, and examination of middle school textbooks and secondary material revealed elite and institutional aspects of the independence movement.

This was my first experience conducting an attitude survey, and I spent several weeks developing the questions (composing more fluid language and reducing the length and complexity of questions), repeatedly experimenting by studying interviewees' reactions to the questions. The questions were derived largely from Dr. Mark Gose's similar work on East and West Germany and were designed to investigate political culture, cultural identity, and socio-political legitimacy. I conducted the survey interviews in tea shops, stores, and in the Taipei train station. Although my sample size of 50 interviewees limited mostly to Taipei could not produce statistically reliable data, conducting the interviews proved to be extremely helpful in several respects: first in understanding the difficulties and intricacies of surveys in the Chinese cultural setting; and their usefulness as primary documents, and second in understanding general Taiwanese attitudes toward their culture, politics, and independence.

I began the interview process by contacting the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the American Cultural Center in Taiwan. At AIT I interviewed the director of the Government Affairs Section, Robert McMahan, and at the American Cultural Center I interviewed the chief of the Cultural and Information Section, John Thompson. I also visited the headquarters of the Democratic Progressive Party and talked with personnel in their Survey Department. I met Michael Hsiao, Michael Chang and Wang Fu-Chang of Academia Sinica's Institute of Sociology, as well as pro-independence activist Chen Ye-Shen of the Institute of Modern History. Finally, I met with DPP pro-independence legislators Lin Chuoshui and Shi Ming-teh and the KMT Deputy Director-General of the Department of Cultural Affairs Mu Ming-Chu. The interviews were helpful in understanding the perspective of the political elite and leaders of the independence movement.

Materials for research included Chinese- and English-language academic works on Taiwanese society, Chinese newspaper and magazine articles, survey results given to me by the DPP and Chinese middle school history, social studies and geography textbooks. The textbooks were helpful as examples of the educational system's role in establishing cultural identity and political attitudes.

BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

The battle over the interpretation of the history of Taiwan is one of the clearest examples of the manipulation of history in order to attain political goals. Proponents of unification will argue that Taiwan was known to Chinese as an uncivilized frontier as early as the 8th century, and that Fujian Chinese were settling and displacing Hakka from choice land by the 13th century.³ The famous Chinese explorer Zheng He landed on the island in 1430, making a written report of his adventures there to the emperor. Chinese settlement on a large scale was occurring by the 17th century. Proponents of independence, however, would point out that during this period, the Chinese government knew and cared very little about Taiwan; not until the Ming Dynasty do Chinese maps accurately depict its location and give it the name "Taiwan." No follow-up voyages to Taiwan were made after Zheng He's report, and it was in fact illegal throughout most of Chinese history to emigrate to Taiwan.

Dutch forces established military control of the Pescadores in 1622, from which they controlled the Taiwan Straits, and established a presence on Taiwan through treaty with the local officials. There is some dispute over whether court officials in Peking made any effective claim to jurisdiction over Taiwan at this point. In 1626 Spanish forces seized the northeastern port of Keelung and controlled northern Taiwan, although the Dutch regained control of the entire island by 1642. It was during this period that permanent Chinese settlement began to grow considerably, although Chinese settlers evidently chafed under Dutch rule, rebelling in 1640 and 1652. Whether they wanted self-rule or Chinese rule depends on one's current political orientation.

The Qing Dynasty (established by the nomadic non-Chinese Manchus from the northeast of China) overthrew the Ming Dynasty in 1644, but a stubborn Ming resistance, led by the famous Chinese historical figure Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), remained based on the island of Taiwan. This son of a pirate from Taiwan and a Japanese woman battled Manchu forces from 1646 to 1658, but, unable to defeat the new Manchurian rulers of China, turned his forces on the Dutch. By 1663, the Dutch succumbed to Koxinga's forces and evacuated the island, leaving Koxinga to establish a Chinese legal and political system based on the Ming. He promoted Chinese culture and religion, as well as massive Chinese immigration, although the Manchu rulers of China were still his enemy. Proponents of unification would emphasize the Chinese-ness of his rule, while independence activists would point out the lack of Mainland control of the island. Furthermore, Taiwan became quite cosmopolitan as a major East Asian trading center, setting her on a quite different track of development from the Mainland.

Several years after the death of Koxinga in 1663, the Manchus took advantage of inept rule and intrigue in the Zheng household, taking control of the island by 1683. From 1683 to 1886, Taiwan was considered part of Fukien (Fujian) Province, and officials sent to this backwater land were often of low caliber. Their corruption, ineptitude and cruelty led to 15 major rebellions between 1683 and 1843, giving the area the name "land of rebellion and unrest." Chinese emigration continued to occur, although until 1732 it was illegal. In the battle against Western intrusion in the 19th century, Taiwan finally took on some degree of importance to the Qing court. However, mixed signals came out of Peking; anytime foreigners encountered trouble in Taiwan, Peking denied any official responsibility.⁴ This was taken by

Americans and the British as a sign that the Qing did not claim sovereignty over the area. But after southern Chinese rebellions in the 1880s, the Qing decided to take advantage of Taiwan's strategic location and officially made it a province by 1887.

As independence proponents are quick to point out, this Mainland interest and tighter control of Taiwan did not last long. Japan began its imperial expansion in 1894 by fighting China over the control of Korea. In humiliating defeat, the Chinese signed the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which turned Taiwan over to the Japanese "in perpetuity." By international law, this meant that Taiwan was no longer under the sovereignty of the Chinese Mainland. Local leaders on Taiwan, however, saw the situation differently, promptly declaring independence and proclaiming the "Republic of Taiwan." This proved to be the futile effort of an elite attempting to hold onto their own power; the island had no centrally recognized political or military power and was beset with problems of warlordism and banditry. Although scattered resistance lasted for several years, unaided by the Peking government, most Taiwanese succumbed to the Japanese rule. Some Chinese, however, remained bitter over the apparent abandonment by the Qing court.

Facing pressure and scrutiny from the West, Japan was eager to make an exemplary colony out of Taiwan. Japanese colonial policy was at the same time beneficial, yet "discriminatory and predatory."⁵ The beneficial aspect derived from strictly imposed social order and development of an economic infrastructure. Japanese rule greatly raised sanitation standards on the island, and their education system one of the most literate, technologically capable, and cosmopolitan populations in Asia. However, the order imposed allowed little or no freedom; "crimes," defined by the Japanese, were punished with extreme harshness, and the Japanese forced their language and sometimes culture on their colonial subjects. The economic development was extractive as well. Proponents of unification contend that Japan "stole" Taiwan from China, suppressing the Chinese population there, while independence supporters highlight the Treaty of Shimonoseki clause relinquishing China's right to Taiwan "in perpetuity," with the subsequent fifty years of lack of Chinese control over the island.

Foundation for the Present Conflict: The War Years and Beyond

KMT Occupation

One can see from Taiwanese history to this point that the people of Taiwan have not often, if ever, controlled their own destiny. The same is certainly true of World War II and following events. While the Japanese built up Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," with compliance and help from the local populace, the Allied Powers were deciding Taiwan's fate in the 1943 Cairo conference. There, Chiang Kai-shek convinced the Allies that Taiwan was one of China's territories stolen by the imperialist Japanese, and the US and Britain agreed that Taiwan should be returned to China, at that time meaning Chiang's government. In fact, Chiang's forces did take the surrender of Japanese on the island, welcomed by most of the population as fellow Chinese liberating them from Japanese colonialism. However, Chiang did not make Taiwan a province, nor did he establish any democratic government; Taiwan's fate was to be embroiled in the Chinese civil war, suffering under a military rule not much different from the Japanese. The Chinese soldiers sent to Taiwan viewed the Taiwanese as tainted at best by fifty

years of Japanese rule, and some even considered them to be traitors. Meanwhile, Taiwan's resources were needed for the raging civil war, so that living standards suffered from wartime conditions. The higher education and economic development experienced by the Taiwanese under the Japanese made them quite different from the war-weary Mainlanders, and animosity quickly grew between the two groups.

Er Er Ba

The most significant event to the independence movement occurred on February 28, 1947, known as *er er ba* for the Chinese pronunciation of the date 2-28. A plainclothes police officer killed a woman selling cigarettes on the black market and was immediately surrounded by a mob. Frightened police fired into the crowd, killing four and sparking nation-wide rioting. Both sides committed atrocities in the following hostilities, though the Mainlanders were obviously in a better military position, using troops armed with heavy weapons to put down this "rebellion." The estimated number of Taiwanese and Mainlanders killed during this incident varies greatly, with the highest estimation of Taiwanese killed at 10,000.⁶ Apparently, some Mainlanders took advantage of this situation to wipe out the most important local political leaders, paving the way for virtually unopposed political takeover by Mainland forces. *Er er ba* is now used as a rallying cry by leaders of the independence movement; the official version denies the worst stories stemming from the event, but in recent years the government has made efforts to assuage the feelings of the opposition and the victims' families.

Waisheng Ren and Bensheng Ren

Chiang's defeat and retreat to Taiwan in 1949 exacerbated tense relations between Mainlanders and Taiwanese as 1.5 million refugees arrived. The refugees and their descendants, even though born and raised on Taiwan since 1949, are known as *waisheng ren* "people from outside the province;" people and their families who lived on Taiwan in 1949 are known as *bensheng ren*. Mainlanders have since constituted approximately 15% of the population, while Taiwanese constitute about 80-85%. The 1949 Mainlanders belonged mainly to two vastly different classes.⁷ The wealthy business, military, and intellectual elite who chose to stick with the KMT rather than face a communist future on the Mainland held many advantages by their close connection to the ruling elite. On the other hand, the majority were poor, mostly penniless soldiers, many of whom had been involuntarily drafted into the army and dragged from their homeland to now fend for themselves in a virtually foreign land. The difference between both groups and the Taiwanese was quite large; the elite disdained the local Taiwanese as country bumpkins with only dim knowledge of higher Chinese culture, while many peasant soldiers found the technological marvels of even a partially industrialized Taiwan beyond their ken. Many Mainlanders wholeheartedly believed in the KMT propaganda that promised immediate takeover of the Mainland, and a quick return to their homeland. Consequently, most did not make arrangements for staying long-term on the island, neglecting to buy houses, land, or set up businesses. Perhaps in the long run this helped alleviate tensions between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, for although a Mainlander elite monopolized political power until the latter 1980s, they could not monopolize economic power. This has made it

difficult for independence agitators to use economic repression by the Mainlanders as an excuse to act.

"There is One China, and Taiwan is a part of China"

It was at this time that the confusing and complex situation developed that would later challenge the self-identity of Taiwanese. Though forced into exile on Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek and his forces maintained that they were the true representatives of the Chinese people, who were suffering under an illegitimate government. Likewise, the PRC was not willing to accept the nationalist's jurisdiction over Taiwan—they had won the civil war, with the exception of taking over Chiang's forces on Taiwan. Chiang and the Nationalists never surrendered to Mao and the Communists. Both sides, or rather the ruling elite on both sides, came to agree on one point: there was only one China and Taiwan was a part of China. The dispute centered on who was the legitimate ruler of the one China. As for the Taiwanese inhabitants of the island, they were to undergo years of education emphasizing that China was one, and that Taiwan was a part of China—a government-reported fact that was not subject to discussion.

At this point we may identify six main categories of people who would form the core of an independence movement: (1) *er er ba* victims' family and friends, (2) politically exiled leaders, (3) landlords who were affected by rent reform and forced land redistribution conducted by the KMT, (4) intellectuals disappointed with the authoritarian KMT regime, (5) students returned from study abroad who brought back ideas of democracy and human rights, (6) the extremely poor, especially workers and farm laborers who were not feeling adequate advancement in their situation.

Taiwan's fate was not only subject to the civil war between the communists under Mao and the nationalists under Chiang; the Korean War heated up the Cold War and suddenly made Taiwan vital to the US fight against communism. Consequently, the 7th Fleet sent into the Taiwan Straits during the war eliminated any threat of invasion on either side; Mao was not going to be given the opportunity to wipe out his archenemy, but neither was Chiang to be allowed to take back the Mainland. This action forced the United States to participate in the fiction that China was one and that the KMT legitimately represented all of China. From this point on, events in Taiwan would be heavily influenced by the Cold War conflict.

KMT Control of Taiwan

Despite the previously described tension between the newly arrived Mainlanders and Taiwanese, both sides soon realized that taking back the Mainland by force was going to take some time; in the meantime, the war with communism could be won on the economic front. With US protection and aid, Taiwanese society enjoyed a period of political stability and economic growth; with minds on business, few bothered about the authoritarian control of the KMT, which at any rate kept society stable and in good order. As *waisheng* and *bensheng* began to intermarry and work together, the animosity lessened considerably, except perhaps for a group of Taiwanese intellectuals and would-be political elite who wished to share in the power structure and diehard Mainlanders anxious to abandon the island to return home. The KMT at least in word held to Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, as modified by Chiang Kai-shek, which promised nationalism, democracy, and "people's livelihood," a type of social welfare, or

equitable distribution of the gains of economic growth. In accordance with the principle of democracy, after a period of tutelage, the KMT immediately allowed local elections with the promise of higher-level participation when the situation allowed.

At the same time, KMT-directed education had its effect on the population, continuously emphasizing the Chinese roots of Taiwan. Some KMT leaders perhaps felt that Taiwan had indeed been tainted by its long subjugation to Japan, and therefore needed to be re-sinicized through education. The 1989 KMT charter still contained this phrase (emphasis added):

"the Kuomintang shall be a revolutionary and democratic political party charged with the mission of completing the National Revolution, carrying out the Three Principles of the People, recovering the Chinese mainland, *promoting Chinese culture*, aligning with other democratic nations, and building the Republic of China into a unified, free, peace-loving, and harmonious democracy based on the Three Principles of the People."⁸

In school, children still memorize Chinese geography and history as their own, with little attention to Taiwanese history except as a part of a larger China. Listening in on a guided tour of the National Museum given to a middle school group, I noticed the guide repeatedly said "*Women Zhongguo Ren*," or "We Chinese" when explaining the ancient artifacts. The children were obviously being conditioned to think of themselves as Chinese, connected by culture, language, and ethnicity to ancestors on the Mainland. Proponents of unification see this as natural, while independence activists view this as state propaganda meant to suppress a Taiwanese identity.

Economic Growth and Social Changes

In 1964, US economic aid to Taiwan stopped, while its economy skyrocketed using the now well-known Asian export-led growth model. The economic development on Taiwan sparked social changes that are even today manifesting themselves. An increasingly affluent middle class began to demand more participation in the political process. Below is a summary of socio-economic changes that challenged the Mainlander KMT's ability to dominate political power:

- Labor Shift From Primary to Secondary Sector
 - 1952 56.1% in primary, 1990 12.9%
 - Manufacture from 12.4% to 32%
- Education Level Increase
 - 1991 illiteracy below 7% (42.1% in 1952!)
 - 1990 57% of 16 yr olds + had completed secondary school
- Income
 - 1994 official per capita income passed US\$12,070
- Increasing Internationalization of Economy
- Increasingly Cosmopolitan Society
- Increasing Experience in Electoral Politics

- "Explosion" in number of civic organization
 - 1952 2,560 with 1.3 million members
 - 1990 13,766 with 10.9 million members⁹

These figures show an increasingly urbanized, educated, cosmopolitan and wealthy populace; these socio-economic changes probably contributed to demands for political democratization, and may have caused some to begin seeing themselves as part of a unique Taiwan experience separate from China.

International Changes and Crisis of Identity

While this internal change was occurring, international events were drastically changing Taiwan's position on the international stage and challenging its self-identity. A US policy of "playing the China card" against the Soviet Union meant that Taiwan lost its UN seat as the representative of Chinese people in 1971. This caused a crisis for the ruling KMT, for it challenged the legitimacy of an authoritarian Mainlander-dominated regime that justified its martial law rule by claiming to represent all of China, not just Taiwan. According to democratic activists, if the KMT did not really represent all of China, then the Taiwanese should have more say in this Taiwanese, not Chinese, government. The radical World United Formosans for Independence, based in the US for fear of repression, actually called for the violent overthrow of the KMT. Despite the upsurge in democratic activism, support for the KMT seemed not to wane; the people's priority appeared to be economic growth, exactly what the KMT had been promoting.

The dramatic switch in US policy in 1979, withdrawing formal recognition of the Republic of China and establishing formal relations with the PRC, brought another crisis to the ruling party. Without the US as its formal ally, Taiwan would have had to go it alone in the world; independence proponents pointed to the gradual loss of international recognition as a failure of an unrealistic unification policy and clear reason why Taiwan should declare independence. Fortunately for Taiwan, the US Congress was quick to assure continued support with the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. The act, still in effect, explicitly refers to the national interest of the US in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and makes it clear that the US intends to deter PRC military action:

"It is the policy of the United States (2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; (3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. (4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States . . . (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan." (Sections 2(a)2, 3, 4 and 6) 10

As the KMT continued to lose its source of legitimacy derived from the increasingly untenable position that it represented all Chinese people, and its unrealistic mission to take back the mainland, it focused on legitimizing its rule as leader of economic development. The democratic movement, allowed to progress at a slow pace determined by KMT elite, also helped to bolster the legitimacy of the KMT government. As long as the two sides of the Taiwan Straits were both authoritarian, repressive governments, the US and other democratic western countries might as well support the bigger and more advantageous Mainland; democratic reform, however, would pacify growing unrest from social change at home while bolstering the image of Taiwan on the international stage. This came at a time when the US increasingly emphasized democracy and human rights in its foreign policy. The US was no longer as willing to tolerate repressive governments, even if they were anti-communist. As a result, by the late 1980s the KMT elite, led by Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo, began opening up the political atmosphere.

Democratization

In this loosening of political controls, popular democracy seemed to grow in companionship with the independence movement. A viable opposition party had been outlawed by the KMT before, but throughout the 70s democratic and independence activists had somewhat coordinated their efforts and were known as the *Dangwai*, literally "outside party." Anticipating an announcement to be made by Chiang Ching-kuo instituting major changes for the upcoming Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elections, the *Dangwai* leaders boldly announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986. By December they ran candidates in the elections, running on platforms that called for further loosening of political restrictions, an end to martial law (which occurred in July 1987), and Taiwan independence.

"Taiwanization" of the KMT

The KMT, however, without supporting formal independence, seemed to be co-opting the opposition's platform. While the opposition complained about over-representation of Mainlanders (*waisheng ren*) in the political system, the KMT was already undergoing a major "Taiwanization" of its membership. Chiang Ching-kuo significantly announced in one speech "I am Chinese, and I am Taiwanese."¹¹ Furthermore, he groomed a native Taiwanese named Lee Teng-hui as his presidential successor and announced that none of his relatives would assume political position. Chiang unexpectedly passed away in January 1988, succeeded by Lee Teng-hui. Under Lee, the Taiwanization of the KMT got under full steam: whereas before the KMT membership mainly consisted of Mainlanders, it now consisted of 70% Taiwanese—much more reflective of the island's population.¹² As for the independence issue, the very act of democratization and economic development was creating a new situation in which Taiwan was realistically independent. This independence resulted from and fostered a national pride among the Taiwanese which the KMT was able to harness into votes for the majority party which had created the situation.

Abandoning Claims to the Mainland

Mainland authorities, along with KMT Mainlanders, sensed and feared this new direction, just at a time when PRC economic policies were showing some measure of success and leaders were more willing to flex their muscle in foreign relations. To assuage both Mainland fears of an independent Taiwan and KMT Mainlander political opponents' criticisms, Lee appointed a strongly pro-unification premier. However, other policies further increased Taiwan's *de facto* independence. The National Affairs Conference of July, 1990, though mainly discussing constitutional changes, agreed on increasing economic ties with the Mainland yet put off unification until much later. The "period for the mobilization of rebellion suppression," in other words the mission to re-take the Mainland, officially ended in 1991, eliminating many political restrictions on the populace.¹³ Finally, Lee began looking for opportunities to increase Taiwan's international recognition, mostly by seeking to join world organizations.

PRC political leaders, on the other hand, were pursuing a hard line of political repression following the massacre at Tiananmen in 1989; being hard on the Taiwan issue would demonstrate their resolve not to be "bullied" by foreign powers in controlling Chinese "internal" affairs. This hard line probably had an unintended effect on the PRC's international relations and image; just at the time when Taiwan was undergoing astoundingly fast and peaceful democratic transformation, the Mainland was gunning down unarmed demonstrators. John Cooper in *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province* notes "It was as if Taiwan had suddenly shed its bad image by transferring it to China."¹⁴ As for the Taiwanese, they were in no hurry to unify with a brutally repressive regime.

Opening the Debate on Independence

Even with the democratic changes and moves making Taiwan more independent, the KMT only slowly allowed formal debate on the independence issue. The National Security Law of 1987 declared, "no person may violate the Constitution or advocate Communism or the division of national territory in the exercise of the people's freedom of assembly and association."¹⁵ The government chose to make examples of some offenders, particularly if they used or called for violence. In April, 1989, outspoken independence advocate Tseng Nan-jung immolated himself rather than accept arrest.¹⁶ In 1990 DPP member Huang Hua was sentenced to 10 years in prison for advocating a "New Nation Movement" and a "Republic of Taiwan." In the same year, however, pro-independence founders of *Formosa Magazine*, Shih Ming-teh and Hsu Hsin-liang, along with other political prisoners, were released from jail, signaling a relaxation of restrictions. Meanwhile, the DPP was testing the limits on the issue. In their first platform, they declared "Taiwan's future should be determined by all residents of Taiwan according to the principles of freedom, self-determination, universality, justice and equality."¹⁷ August of 1991 a DPP seminar drafted a constitution, proclaiming "Taiwan is a democratic republic of the people, by the people and for the people. The nation's name is the Republic of Taiwan."¹⁸ In October 1991 the party convention went so far as to call for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan to be submitted to a plebiscite of the Taiwanese people, provoking a disastrous reaction in the Taiwanese stock market. Furthermore, the DPP performed disastrously in that December's National Assembly elections, prompting the KMT to claim that the populace had overwhelmingly rejected Taiwan independence at the polls.¹⁹

The poor electoral results, perceived by some in the party as at least partly connected to the recent radical pro-independence stance, exposed disagreements and fissures in the opposition forces. The DPP has traditionally been split into two main factions: The Formosan Faction and the New Tide Faction, and each has a slightly different policy regarding independence. The Formosan Faction, mainly a coalition of Taipei intellectuals with local politicians, is "only weakly ideological in seeking democracy and national realization and is mostly oriented toward election results." According to one faction member, "it does not sow divisiveness to disturb the economy, nor will it recklessly provoke the People's Republic of China."²⁰ Hsu Hsin-liang, current head of DPP, is a well-known member of this pragmatic faction. He still has a history, however, of strong connections with radical pro-independence groups. In the mid-1980s he allied with the World United Formosans for Independence, a member of the Marxist-based Taiwan Independence Army, and the Taiwan Revolutionary party (later the Taiwan Democratic Movement Overseas).²¹

The New Tide Faction opposes the monopolization of power by the Formosan Faction, while they also tend to be more ideological and adamant in their call for independence. I interviewed two of the more famous members of this faction: Shih Ming-teh, previously a long-term political prisoner and several times chair of the DPP, and Lin Chuo-shui, author of the DPP's Republic of Taiwan resolution. The New Tide group combines Taiwanese nationalism/independence with clear calls for social reform.²²

Despite disappointment at the polls, the political atmosphere continued to improve and restrictions on the independence movement gradually lifted. On 15 May 1992 the Legislative Yuan revised Article 100 of the criminal code which had been used to jail those accused of "intent" to divide the national territory or to illegally change the constitution. It now made only division of national territory or changes to the constitution through "violence or coercion" illegal. Peaceful organizations or speeches promoting Taiwan Independence were made entirely legal.

The New Tide Faction is now being pulled apart by differences on the independence issue. After the perceived disastrous showing of staunch independence advocate Peng Min-ming in the March 1996 presidential election, Shih Ming-teh resigned as DPP party chair to be replaced by Hsu Hsin-liang, who, as head of the Formosan Faction, has led the DPP on a more pragmatic approach. I noted in conversations with DPP members that the DPP official line now on the independence movement closely resembles the KMT line: Taiwan is already in fact independent, so there is no need to formally declare independence. Peng Min-ming's followers have determined to establish a new party in response to this perceived compromise on the independence issue. In my interview with Shih, I found a great displeasure in this development; according to Shih, this fracturing of the opposition can only slow or stop democratic gains so painfully made to this point. Although the independence issue is the most hotly debated topic in recent elections, many in the opposition are also concerned about building social policies, checking government corruption, and becoming a viable and responsible political force. Independence, in the sense of formally declaring a separate Republic of Taiwan, may be a divisive issue for Taiwanese society in general, although elections make it clear that a large majority don't support it right now; the really divisive nature of the issue, ironically, appears to be among various pro-independence groups.

Summary

In summary, Taiwan's history may easily be viewed as a part of Chinese history, yet it has taken a unique path of development, particularly in the last 100 years. Occupied and developed for fifty years by Japan, embroiled in the KMT-PRC civil war, developing a semi-capitalist wealthy society, all the while subject to the tidal changes of international affairs, the national identity of the Taiwanese people is understandably complex and confusing. In order to further understand the present situation, and the possible future of the independence movement, I will now examine Taiwanese society's political culture, cultural identity, and sense of political legitimacy.

THEORETICALLY SPEAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING TAIWANESE SOCIETY

Dr. (Major) Mark Gose of the USAFA Political Science Department, in exploring the role of the military in building political community in East and West Germany, identifies a political socialization process/policy occurring in the two Germanys aimed at building a distinct political community, just as the independence movement in Taiwan attempts to build a political community separate from a "Greater China." He conceptualizes three possible outcomes of the socialization process which may also indicate the formation of a political community. These are "1) the creation (or continuation) of a new and distinct *political culture*, 2) the development (or reinforcement) of a separate *cultural identity*, and 3) the enhancement (or maintenance) of legitimacy for the new socio-political structure, or *socio-political legitimacy*."²³ Though the Taiwan-Mainland China case is quite different than the East-West German case, this conceptualization of the process of political community building is useful in examining the effectiveness of the independence movement (and in the creation of a distinct political community on Taiwan with or without an organized movement).

Nations and States

How is a new nation-state formed? Is it naturally formed from a community with common ties, a nation, that voluntarily establishes a state? Or is it engineered by a political elite, perhaps as part of a state apparatus that wishes to forge a nation? In the case of Taiwan, has her unique historical experience, shared culture, language and ethnicity, and geography provided a natural foundation for an independent nation that will create its own state; or is the state, or elite members of the independence movement, consciously building a new nation? Major Gose discusses the general research concerning *nation-building* versus *state-building*, particularly in determining whether it is a state that forges a nation, or a nation that naturally gives rise to a state. Scholars viewing the nation primarily as a derivation of the state hold that "the primary foundations for nation-building and political development are a result of modernization, institutionalization, communication, etc." Other scholars see the nation as a naturally occurring entity based on a sense of cultural or moral community; this nation, rather than being engineered in a conscious way by a state, naturally creates its own state.²⁴

Distinguishing between a *nation* and a *state* is a critical issue in the independence-unification debate on Taiwan. For convenience, I will use Gose's succinct definition of a nation: "a nation is defined as a group of people who are linked in a distinct community and perceive themselves as part of a shared unique society. This sense of community may stem from culture, language, religion, race/ethnicity, shared history, common moral values, mutual goals, commonly perceived threats, or shared political values."²⁵ This definition includes both cultural and political elements. A *state*, on the other hand, is more of a legal invention with recognized authority and legitimacy to rule over a group of people. A state, as opposed to a nation, has fixed geographic boundaries including a population of citizens, sovereignty to rule over the people and territory within those boundaries, and is recognized by other nation-states as the "indisputable legitimate authority within its territory."

Theoretically, the Taiwan state, until the recent past meaning the Kuomintang ruling party, has tried to create an identification with the Chinese territory and people across the Taiwan straits, even claiming that the KMT government represented the people of the mainland in a nation-state that was legitimately called China. However, a different track of modernization and social mobilization on the island of Taiwan as opposed to Mainland China has in fact created an independent entity. A large capitalist middle class participating in an independent democratic political system is very conscious of its distinction from the Mainland society and political system. Meanwhile, leaders of the independence movement are consciously trying to create a Taiwan national consciousness that will result in the formal declaration of an independent nation-state. Thus on Taiwan the state, through promoting economic, political and social change, has indeed built a political community (a nation) without declaring itself an independent nation-state, while an elite separate from the state seeks to take this process further, to the point of building a Taiwan national consciousness and formally declaring Taiwan a separate nation-state.

However, ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties could also justify the "natural" formation of a nation including both sides of the Taiwan Straits. While attitudes have recently undergone some change, most Taiwanese feel a natural tie toward the culture and people of the Mainland and look forward to eventual unification under one state. Whether this is truly "natural" or simply because of the social engineering conducted by the KMT in its quest to take back the Mainland and to claim legitimacy as the ruling state of China is difficult to determine. However, one cannot deny the obvious links: geographical proximity, the writing system (even though the native language is different than the standard Mandarin, it is derived from the Mainland), the cultural tradition, though flavored by local practices, is essentially Chinese, and the majority of people are ethnically of the Chinese Han nationality. On the other hand, pro-independence activists would point out that the independent city-state of Singapore also shares these characteristics while remaining independent. They might also point to the historical example of the United States and Great Britain: The United States share ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties with Great Britain, forming a "natural" nation, yet declared its independence as a nation-state. The problem for these pro-independence activists, then, is changing the existing attitudes that feel a natural affinity toward unification.

Political Community

Attitude change and political socialization is a much-researched field of study in sociology. Theories as to how and why people change their attitudes (opinions, beliefs, etc.), as Gose points out, are wide-ranging, but most relevant to a study of political community building are those that assume "that attitudes can be formed or modified by some learning principle . . . often termed 'behaviorist' theory or 'Stimulus-Response' theory." Especially important is the research dealing with political socialization and attitude change—"those processes or agents by and through which individuals form or change their attitudes and beliefs about the particular political/cultural collectivity in which they live and interact."²⁶ Political Scientist G. A. Almond, known for his work in political culture, explained

"All political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time . . . they do this by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation."²⁷

In *National Identity*, Anthony Smith explains,

"A political community . . . implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they belong. This was very much what the *philosophes* had in mind when they defined a nation as a community of people obeying the same laws and institutions with a given territory."²⁸

From this definition one can easily see the problem faced by Taiwan, particularly as the democratization process accelerates on the island. Taiwan elects its own leaders, obeys its own laws, shares a well-defined territory. It is the ethnic and cultural affinity toward the mainland that prevents the complete formation of an independent political community.

This research points out the importance of a conscious political socialization process in changing or maintaining political community. Critical to an understanding of the Taiwanese Independence Movement and its future is determining whether a political socialization process is occurring and having an effect on Taiwan that will eventually lead to the establishment of an independent nation-state of Taiwan. This process could be through economic, political and social developments promoted by the ruling government or could be led by pro-independence activists. My survey addresses this in part by asking questions pertaining to the agents of political and cultural attitude formation: government, media, family, education, and work environment.

Political Culture

Before moving on to survey results examining political and cultural attitudes, I will further explain the concepts of *political culture*, *cultural identity* and *socio-political legitimacy* as indicators of the development of a political community. As Gose sums up from the political culture literature, *political culture* "represents collectively shared norms and values relative to political ideology, definitions of citizenship, the 'proper' structure of the polity, beliefs about the appropriate relationship between individual and government, and the general relationships between political institutions and the overall society."²⁹

Lucian W. Pye, exploring the Asian economic miracle in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Feb 94, provides an earlier, somewhat simplified formulation:

The notion of political culture assumes that the attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions that inform and govern *political behavior* in any society are not just random congeries but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing. In

spite of the great potentialities for diversity in political orientations, in any particular community there is a limited and distinct political culture which gives meaning, predictability, and form to the political process. The concept of political culture assumes that each individual must, in his own *historical* context, learn and incorporate into his own *personality* the knowledge and feelings about the politics of his people and his community. This means in turn that the political culture of a society is limited but given firm structure by the factors basic to *dynamic psychology*. Each generation must receive its politics from the previous one, each must react against that process to find its own politics, and the total process must follow the laws that govern the development of the individual personality and the general *culture* of a society.³⁰

Elizabeth Perry, in a foreward to *Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China*, discusses a "New Political Culture." Though this is concerned with using political culture in examining popular protest on Mainland China, it applies to Taiwanese society as well.

Whereas earlier cultural initiatives were promoted variously by historians steeped in sinology or by political scientists seeking to link up with the latest disciplinary fad, the current turn to culture has attracted historians and social scientists alike. Happily, recent years have seen a blurring of the sharp division between history and the social sciences that emerged with the second generation of contemporary China specialists. . . .

We have all learned a great deal about the *complexities* of Chinese society and politics—past and present. Our picture of "traditional" culture is a more refined one (with greater appreciation of temporal and regional variation) than was available to preceding generations. . . .

One result of this new accumulation of knowledge is an aversion to static or monochromatic portraits of Chinese culture. Differences in time period, social status, and geographical location were, we now realize, characterized by important distinctions in belief and behavior. As a consequence, the challenge to the student of contemporary Chinese popular protest is to discover which of a multitude of available cultural repertoires is being drawn upon. Moreover, recognition of the fluidity and flexibility of cultural practice alerts the analyst to the possibility of innovation and originality. Rather than seeing Chinese politics as forever condemned to a treadmill of repetitive patterns, we look instead for creative deviation and breakthrough. . . .

By providing "equal time" for cultural practice and social structure, refusing to elevate either to the level of "independent variable," the neoculturalist perspective strives for a comprehensive understanding of political change. It is this feature of the approach, we submit, that will rescue it from the short-lived fates suffered by previous culturalist efforts.

Cultural Identity

Identity is a nebulous concept that may change throughout a person's lifetime, and depends greatly on context. Alan Wachman, researching competing identities in Taiwan, says, "identity is a sentiment of attachment based on one's belief that a community exists and that one 'belongs' in that community."³¹ That sentiment of attachment may be based on many foundations—language, race, place, religion, shared historical experience, even shared political beliefs—with the result that cultural identity may be overlapping or shifting. Identity is primarily emotion-based rather than reason-based, making "analysis" of cultural identity more difficult.

Political Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is based on the feeling of the populace that a state has the right to rule over them. The *Dictionary of Political Thought* defines legitimacy as "The process whereby power gains acceptance for itself in the eyes of those who are governed by it, by generating a belief in its legitimacy . . ."³² Gose further explains "Legitimacy is . . . identified and hence realized in many ways – through popular support and compliance, the realization of a recognized sense of national sovereignty and pride by the people, increased patriotism relative to the nation-state, and importantly, through at least the tacit acceptance of the current socio-political structure." He points out that "in partitioned nation-states, the question of legitimacy often revolves around the issue of whether there exists a direct link between the present situation of the new state and the past history and traditions of the overall culture."³³ In the past, the legitimacy of the KMT rested on three pillars: retaking the mainland, keeping the Chinese civilization tradition (including the traditional intellectual and cultural tradition), and economic growth. The KMT no longer claims to be mobilizing to retake the Mainland, and modernization has largely made the backwards-looking effort to maintain the Confucian tradition irrelevant. My impression from my survey was that Taiwanese are not concerned with whether the Taiwanese government is the legitimate successor to the "past history and traditions of the overall culture." An independent political community seems to be forming on Taiwan as Taiwanese experience democracy and increasingly feel that their government is the legitimate ruling authority of the island, while the government has given up claims of legitimacy over the people of the Mainland. The following table from Gose sums up the role of political culture, cultural identity, and socio-political legitimacy in creating political community.

Political Community: Conceptualizing the Outcomes³⁴

| Political Culture | Cultural Identity | Socio-Political Legitimacy |
|--|---|---|
| Ideological Orientation: With what political norms and values — i.e., ideology? — do most of the populace identify (e.g., Socialist, Communist, Democracy)? | Dominant Cultural Affiliation: With what cultural community do most people identify (e.g., East Asian, Chinese, Taiwanese, Gaohsiung Province)? | Perceived Legitimacy as a Regime or State: Does the general populace accept and support the new state as representative of the traditional political norms and values of the nation — the logical successor to its past polities? |
| Structure of the Polity: What form of government and what types of political institutions/political groups do most people prefer? | The Defining Cultural Determinants: What are the perceived primary cultural foundations of the partitioned nation (e.g., region, language, ethnicity, religion, economic class, etc.)? | Perceived Legitimacy as a Society: Does the general populace accept and support the new social system as one reflecting the cultural norms and values of the past nation? |
| Role of the Citizen: What is the proper relationship of the citizen to the polity (e.g., the nature of political participation, role of the individual in elite selection, the extent of political knowledge, etc.)? | Predominant Cultural Norms and Values: What are the cultural norms and values which prevail in the society (e.g., values such as self-sacrifice, discipline, hard work, respect for authority, etc.)? | Perceived Legitimacy as an International Actor: Does the general populace accept the new state as one which represents the "true" nation in the world at large? |

APPLICATION OF THEORY:

TAIWANESE POLITICAL CULTURE, CULTURAL IDENTITY AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

And the Survey Says . . .

The above discussion helps to put the problem of understanding a national independence movement and the building of an independent political community into perspective. My survey conducted in Taipei, Taiwan between June 13 and September 2, 1996 investigated the elements of political culture, cultural identity, and political legitimacy in Taiwanese society. I have also collected information from other surveys that addresses these aspects of political community. Before analyzing the results from these surveys, I will discuss the considerable problems with relying on survey data to indicate political and cultural attitudes, as well as attitudes toward unification or independence.

Problems With Surveys

In developing and conducting my own survey, and in discussions with Academia Sinica sociologists and DPP and KMT poll takers, I came to realize certain inevitable problems with surveys conducted in Taiwanese society. As with any survey in any society, the context of the questions greatly affect answers. The most important examples of this are questions regarding cultural identity. When a person is confronted with a question like "Do you see yourself primarily as East Asian, Chinese, Taiwanese, . . .?" a question frequently asked in polls, he or she will have tremendous difficulty answering the question without some sort of context. I as a foreigner asking the question may elicit more responses that distinguish the interviewee from a westerner—thus the self-identity may be more general. On the other hand, just as someone visiting California might identify themselves as a Hoosier from Indiana, a respondent asked by a Taiwanese might be more specific in their response. I asked respondents to choose only one response, as many other polls do, but I found in some respondents considerable resistance to having to answer just one. This strikes me as compatible with a Chinese cultural aspect that is willing to accept more than one version of the "truth," or to recognize many aspects of the "truth." Just as some may identify themselves as Daoists yet participate in Buddhist temple ceremonies, many may recognize themselves as East Asian, Chinese, and Taiwanese depending on the circumstance. Even answering "Taiwanese" to this question may not indicate that one does not feel a sense of identity with Chinese ethnicity or culture, and certainly seems not to be a reliable indication that one supports an independent Taiwan nation-state. Perhaps most useful are those series of surveys that ask the same question over a period of time. These surveys do give some indication that the population's sense of being predominantly "Taiwanese" is growing.

Wording and order of answers is a related problem affecting surveys. For instance, the Democratic Progressive Party asks the question, "The PRC Government has always said that the desire of people from both sides of the Straits is unification—Do you agree or disagree with this statement?" The purpose of this question is to measure public attitudes toward unification, yet the wording conspicuously demands that the respondent agree or disagree with the communist

government of the mainland, quite possibly evoking emotions that affect the response. In my survey giving a list of public institutions and asking respondents to rate their influence on political and cultural attitudes, the order of that list seems quite important. Respondents seemed to pay more attention to and consider more carefully those choices first on the list. If a respondent is answering a survey with little or no interest (perhaps responding to be polite), then the longer the survey the less considered the answers at the end will be.

Another widely-recognized Chinese cultural trait is an emphasis on order and harmony. This may mean that respondents to polls will be reluctant to answer truthfully, and will answer to conform to the truth of the interviewer to preserve harmony. In my polling experience, I found few people who seemed enthusiastically interested in the topic of the poll, although nearly all were polite and willing to answer the questions. Several interviewees asked me how I wanted them to answer the questions, and many were willing to circle choices but did so cursorily. Many may have been wary talking to a stranger, particularly a foreigner (although foreigners are a common sight in Taipei, as opposed to rural areas or the Mainland); I found older people, especially women, and apparently lower economic class people (wearing factory or construction clothing, e.g.) particularly suspicious and unwilling to answer the survey. I suspect this may not simply be because I was a foreigner, though, and may be a problem for anyone taking a poll in Taiwan. Though unwilling to answer the survey, many still engaged in conversation, but told me their opinions didn't matter or that they didn't get involved in politics. Even with years of modernization and democratization, the society is still conservative and speaking one's opinion in public, even to an anonymous pollster, is not a common practice.

Finally, poll-taking in Taiwan suffers from problems in understanding of terms and concepts. The concept of being Chinese or Taiwanese mixes ethnicity, culture, and government together in a jumbled mix. The term *minzu* can be translated into race or ethnicity, implying blood relationship, but also may take on a broader sense of a nation. The word for nation, *guojia*, is rooted in an ancient China that did not recognize the modern concept of sovereign nation-states and has had a strong racial connotation to it. The word for freedom, *ziyou*, has a selfish, chaotic feel to it for many Chinese. My survey questions inquiring about sources of political attitudes and cultural identity may be confusing or misconstrued; until the last decade, both of these were determined by the state and not up for discussion or change. Perhaps the growing popularity of poll-taking is part of a learning about democracy and freedom of thought and speech that is still in progress.

Analysis of Survey Results

With the previously mentioned caveats in mind, we may still learn about Taiwanese society and attitudes for independence from my and others' surveys. First, I will examine my sample's characteristics. I attempted to make the survey "semi-random" – that is, I tried to speak with people of all different age groups, economic levels and occupations, but I wanted an approximate 50-50 mix of female-male (I achieved a 48-52 mix), and I wanted voting-age people. As I mentioned, I experienced the most resistance or refusals from older females and lower economic class people, while the places that I frequented to conduct the survey (mostly the Taipei train station) also contain mostly lower to middle economic class, leaving a gap on both

ends of the economic spectrum. The sample also seems biased toward a more educated population; 64% had a college education or above.

Taiwan Political Culture: Survey Analysis

The first section of the survey, as well as question 17, are designed to investigate *political culture*. Perhaps one familiar with East Asian society should not be surprised to find that respondents clearly favored order and security over individual freedom, although I was surprised at how complete that feeling was. If a respondent rated order and freedom both the same, I asked them to tell me which they felt was the most important; with the exception of 2 who more highly valued government protection of individual freedom, and 1 who chose national defense, all others rated preserving order in society as government's most important responsibility. From my sample at least, it is clear that these Taiwanese accept and expect government involvement in providing welfare and promoting business, confirming support for a widely-recognized East Asian development model that sees government highly involved in the economies. This also reflects government education in Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles: Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood (the last term is open to various interpretations, but clearly emphasizes "equitable" distribution of wealth while promoting "capitalist" economic growth). The high marks given government in its influence on political attitudes also indicates the influence and authority that the state has in Taiwan. On the other hand, the survey clearly demonstrates that most Taiwanese are not interested in politics, or at least in the antics of political parties: 70% either did not support a party or did not answer the question on support of political parties. This supports the view that the Taiwanese political culture is generally non-ideological.

The most important point of this section regarding the independence movement is the obvious emphasis on order. The independence movement has been seen by most Taiwanese as irresponsible and too chaotic (*luan*). Pro-independence, anti-government activities (the two are often related) have included demonstrations that have sometimes been violent; innocent people riding busses past demonstrators have been injured by hurtled stones, and the beautiful Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park has been defaced by activists. These expressions of social protest are not very well accepted in Chinese society, and have given the movement a reputation for being "out of control."

Also important in Chinese political culture, related to this preference for order, is a desire for a strong and rich state. For many, it makes sense to seek unification with China, for the potential for building an international superpower with wealth and influence is much more realistic when joined with the resources of the Mainland.

Political Culture: Scholars' Analysis

Linda Arrigo describes Taiwanese political culture as such:

In Taiwan the hegemonic political culture is composed of several strands that are familiar in . . . other Confucian authoritarian environments: The rulers are stern but benevolent, and keep social order for the sake of all. Democracy is advancing with the development of parliamentary procedure, and all must play by the "rules of the game," even if they may be rigged. The opposition is dangerous radicals who stir social discontent. Politics is dangerous and dirty; all politicians are more or less corrupt. Society accepts collusion, so it should not be resisted.³⁵

The independence movement, as a political movement, suffers from the above mentioned problems. Certainly some see pro-independence activists as "dangerous radicals." The independence movement, as a part of the political process on Taiwan, has also recently suffered factionalism perhaps due to the perception that some of the opposition politicians are tainting the ideologically pure movement with dirty politics.

Factions in Taiwan's Political Culture

Author Joseph Bosco elaborates on factions, connections (*guanxi*), and patronage in Taiwanese politics in a way that sheds light on the political process of the independence movement. He pays particular attention to the workings of political machines at the local level, chronicling the process of electoral organization, "vote buying" and building political influence in local Taiwanese politics. He notes that Taiwanese politics is based on sharply-defined factions sometimes, but not always, based on personal loyalties to an individual or family. These local factions are political machines, "a special case of a regime that bases its authority largely on its distributive activity (service, effectiveness)."³⁶ Some Taiwanese may vote on ideological issues such as independence, particularly in national elections, but the voters are usually more practical. "The DPP recruits its supporters not with factions (which it does not control) and political favors (which it is in a weak position to offer), but by attracting ideologically committed protest votes with calls for more democracy and the advocacy of Taiwan independence. A few charismatic candidates can win with such appeals when they run for high-level offices . . . but most candidates for these offices win with faction support."³⁷

Bosco further points out that the factional politics of Taiwan evolved because the KMT state was a strong state with freedom to set economic policy; however, they were also "an elite immigrant socially and ethnically different from, and previously unconnected to, the Taiwanese local elite." To govern this local elite, the KMT offered local elections but disallowed political party formation that would challenge KMT political control. The result was faction formation that served to distributed government service and rewards: "factions arose to mediate between the mainlander state and local society, earning power and prestige by their ability to help individuals unable to appeal directly to the KMT-controlled government and courts."³⁸

Finally, and perhaps most importantly to the independence movement, Bosco concludes that factions have had an unintentional effect on Taiwan's political culture: they have muted

class consciousness. He applies J. C. Scott's work *Comparative Political Corruption* with the following quote: "The effect of machine rule under universal suffrage is to submerge growing collective policy demands with immediate pay-offs, thereby retarding the development of class-based political interests among the lower strata. The machine's lower-class voters are disaggregated and dealt with particularistically while its upper class financial backers and bureaucratic capitalists find their collective interests well cared for." The result in Taiwan has been a successful transformation of an elite, Mainlander-dominated rule to a cooperative KMT-Taiwanese rule, characterized by a nonideological political culture.³⁹ This general satisfaction with KMT (although by no means complete—recall that politics is expected to be corrupt and undesirable) and the nonideological political culture provides infertile ground for the independence movement.

Ideological Basis of Taiwan's Political Culture

Thomas Metzger, author of *The Unification of China and the Problem of Public Opinion in the Republic of China*, also examines the political culture of Taiwan and notes the conflict caused by the independence movement. He identifies five basic kinds of political thought that have evolved in Taiwan over recent decades:

- The Three Principles of the People "calling for the independence of China from foreign control, for a prosperous economy minimizing inequality, and for democracy."⁴⁰
- Modern Confucian Humanism, which would continue the tradition of a moral, educated elite rule concerned about the welfare of the people.
- Chinese Liberalism, fueled by a western-educated elite promoting ideas of direct democracy and human rights.
- Taiwan Independence Movement mixed with Chinese Liberalism.
- Less ideological, more practical political viewpoints typical of the grassroots.

He further explains that there is consensus on all but independence revolving around:

- Chinese patriotism
- commitment to modernization
- acceptance of capitalism
- commitment to Millsian concepts of democratization
- opposition to communism

The pattern of political thought that is most debated today in Taiwanese society, however, is the Taiwan Independence Movement. Metzger particularly notes that political consensus is endangered by the dispute between two groups taking extreme positions: Mainlanders, meaning those families, including later generations, that came over about 1949, and Separatists. Mainlanders supposedly don't believe further transformation of the PRC is necessary before unification, and don't recognize the interests, rights, and will of the people in determining unification. Separatists, on the other hand, may provoke a military takeover and

risk losing everything by declaring formal independence, with the opposite intended effect of their independence campaign. In fact, the evidence indicates that only a few occupy these extremes, and that most are grouped about a central position that neither advocates immediate independence nor seeks unconditional unification.

Cultural Identity: Survey Analysis

The middle section of my survey is intended to investigate cultural identity. If the Independence Movement is to succeed on Taiwan, it would appear that changes to the population's cultural and political identity would have to occur, at least to the extent that people felt they were as much or more Taiwanese than Chinese. Although the percent of people identifying themselves as primarily Taiwanese has risen over recent years, the majority still see themselves as either Chinese or both Chinese and Taiwanese. Furthermore, those that identify themselves as Taiwanese do not necessarily support the independence movement. 46% of those answering my poll identified themselves solely as Chinese, while only 30% answered Taiwanese only, even though 72% of respondents were *bensheng*. More extensive surveys also bear out this identification with Chinese culture on an equal or greater level than identification with Taiwan.

The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), a government-sponsored organization dealing with cross-strait relations, took a poll in 1994 (Charts 3-9) which showed nearly half of the respondents identifying themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and a greater number claiming Chinese only (23.8%) than claiming Taiwanese identity (22.5%). Cross-analysis reveals that the younger, the more educated, and females are more likely to see themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese. This poll's result also shows a remarkable difference in cultural identity between the two major opposition parties. 46.6% of those supporting the DPP identified themselves as Taiwanese; nearly 90% of New Party members saw themselves as either Chinese or Chinese *and* Taiwanese. The DPP officially supports independence, while the New Party calls for negotiations and a faster track toward unification. A similar MAC poll one year later showed little change in the number of those with Chinese only self-identity, but the Taiwanese identification rose to 27%.

The Democratic Progressive Party poll series from 1995 (Chart 10) used a much more direct questioning method that discouraged fence-sitting. Hence, they show about 35% identifying themselves as Chinese, while about 30% see themselves as Taiwanese. The United Daily poll (Chart 11), because of its questioning technique, produced different results as well. They asked, "Do you feel that you personally are a Taiwanese person? Or a Chinese person?" Respondents were asked to pick one of the two (as I had asked my respondents with some resistance); their results between 1989 and 1994, while giving much higher percentages of "Chinese" or "Taiwanese" identity, importantly reveal a trend of greater Taiwanese awareness. Those answering Taiwanese rise from less than 20% in 1989 to over 40% in 1994, even surpassing those with "Chinese" primary identity. This rise seems particularly sensitive to international events; Mainland China's policy of isolating Taiwan may be having an opposite effect of strengthening Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, that percentage identifying themselves as Chinese has remained extremely steady, so that a division between Chinese and

Taiwanese identity may be getting more marked in Taiwanese society. For example, PRC missile exercises last year elicited street demonstrations from both groups, shouting "I'm Taiwanese!" or "I'm Chinese!" in the streets of Taipei.

Cultural Identity: Scholars' Analysis

Categories of Identities

Several scholars have noted this "identity crisis" on Taiwan; Alan M. Wachman's *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* examines the link between recent democratic changes and the division between Chinese- and Taiwanese- centered identity, while Thomas B. Gold has written on "Taiwan's Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China." Wachman sees a link between "the two political problems most evident in Taiwan since the mid-1980s . . . (1) the demands for greater participation, fairness, and equity in the political system, and (2) the absence of consensus regarding national identity."⁴¹ Mostly relying on interviews of society intellectual, political, and economic elite (statistical evidence conspicuously absent), he focuses on the struggle of democratic activists against the authoritarian KMT regime, arguing that despite KMT efforts to "force" sinicization on the people, they may have produced an opposite reaction. "Surely, by viewing the Taiwanese as a group that needed to be assimilated forcibly, the KMT inadvertently nourished the Taiwanese sense of distinctiveness that was the seed of the Taiwan independence movement."⁴² His work has the distinctly flavor of the opposition's point of view that tends to emphasize the Taiwanese-Chinese distinction. He summarizes the various identities thus:

- (1) Mainlanders who associate themselves with the KMT tend to embrace all Han Chinese as part of the "Chinese" nation.
- (2) Many Taiwanese see themselves as constituting a nation distinct from the Chinese—even as they acknowledge that they are *culturally* Chinese. Some of these Taiwanese claim to be culturally Taiwanese and reject "mainland" culture.
- (3) Other Taiwanese recognize that they are part of the Chinese nation, but demur at being subsumed by the Chinese state—where the Chinese state means the PRC.
- (4) Taiwan-born Mainlanders cannot comfortably identify themselves as either Taiwanese or Chinese. They recognize there is a Taiwanese nation of which they are not a part and yet they do not share their parents' sense of identity with the Chinese nation. This sense of rootlessness is doubly confusing for those whose parentage is "mixed."
- (5) Taiwanese born, educated, and socialized by the KMT may, like the Taiwan-born Mainlanders with whom they have grown up and gone to school, suffer from divided loyalties and confusion about their identity.⁴³

Thomas Gold's article on "Taiwan's Quest for Identity" highlights the KMT's abandonment of leading the re-conquest of the Mainland as a leading cause of an identity crisis. He also notes the danger of this abandonment to the KMT.

"The issues of a 'Taiwanese identity' and who can share it are fraught with sensitive and dangerous political implications. . . . Admittedly, the KMT underwent a very dramatic 'Taiwanization' in the 1980s and early 1990s and is no longer identifiable as a 'mainlander' party. But it officially keeps alive the idea that Taiwan has a special and sacred role to play in Chinese national politics. So questioning this and raising the idea of a unique 'Taiwan identity' as well as 'self-determination' by the people of the island as to its future, are political dynamite."⁴⁴

What's in a Name? Terms, Identity, and Confusion of Ethnicity, Culture, and Politics

Michael Chang, sociology research fellow at Academia Sinica and editor of 族群關係與國家認同 (*Ethnic Relationship and National Identity*) pointed out an important aspect of cultural and national identity in discussing the Chinese term for nation/country and for China—國家 *Guojia* and 中國 *Zhongguo*. I pointed out to Dr. Chang that I had noticed the Chinese character 國 *guo* consists of a mouth, representing the population, a line representing land, and a weapon, all surrounded by a border. The population has primarily been considered to be one race, the dominant Han race. The second character of the term nation or country, 家 *jia*, is a picture of a pig under a roof and by itself means family. In ancient times, the political thought, influenced by Confucianism, regarded the state and nation as one family, with the emperor as father and head. The association with a family indicates the strong connection Chinese thought has made between a nation/country and blood or race ties. The Chinese term for China, *Zhongguo* literally means "Central Country," reflecting a previous attitude of cultural, and to a much lesser extent, racial superiority. As an example, I pointed out that a Chinese may emigrate to America, become a citizen, and be regarded easily by other Americans as a *Meiguo ren*, or American; however, if I were to live my entire life in Taiwan, perhaps even becoming a citizen (though obtaining "citizenship" for foreigners is nearly impossible), I would never be considered by most Taiwanese as a *Zhongguo ren*. This was also evident in a Chinese newspaper article I had recently read of an American woman who had married a Taiwanese over 20 years ago, but was still not accepted by her neighbors as a fellow citizen.

Dr. Chang agreed that many in Taiwanese society suffered from a general confusion of race, politics, and culture that has been perpetuated by KMT education. The western concept of a modern nation-state is only vaguely taught in school. The strong cultural and racial ties between Taiwan and the Mainland thus become closely linked with political control. Many Taiwanese might feel that it is "natural" for the Han race and Chinese culture to be united under one political system. Interestingly, Dr. Chang is currently on a committee that is writing a new chapter into the national middle school curriculum entitled "We Are All Taiwanese."

Pro-independence advocates, many of whom are well educated and have a clear understanding of western concepts of multi-ethnic nation-states, and multi-state ethnicities, recognize this confusion and seek to better educate the Taiwanese populace. Legislative Yuan member Lin Chuo-shui recounted to me an incident in which a leading Mainland political

figure, perhaps Deng Xiaoping, visited Singapore, which is populated by a majority of ethnically Han Chinese. In a speech there, the leader wished to emphasize the unity of the Han race, and said, “我們都是中國人,” or “We are all *Zhongguo ren* (Chinese).” This statement brought an angry reaction from Singapore officials and press; they consider *Zhongguo* a political term that means the political entity of Mainland China. They are Singaporeans, not Chinese. If they refer to their ethnic identity, they will use the term 華裔 *huayi*. Back in America, vacationing with my family, I recently met an ethnic Chinese from Malaysia. As I engaged him in Chinese language conversation about this very problem of ethnic and cultural identity, he described himself as *huayi*. I turned to my wife to translate that he had just described himself as “Overseas Chinese;” he very emphatically, in English this time, told me no, he was not overseas Chinese, he was simply *huayi*; overseas Chinese would have implied a closer connection, particularly political control, to China than he recognized. Politically, he was Malaysian. Thus, his reaction demonstrated the clear distinction between ethnic heritage and politics that Representative Lin wished to point out in his story about Singapore. It is the desire of Lin and other independence activists that some day Taiwanese will feel the same way about China—they will recognize themselves as *huayi*, but will politically consider themselves citizens of a separate nation-state known as Taiwan.

Activists like Lin are thus very considered in their use of terms and definitions. For example, Lin referred to his parents as *Taiwan Huaren* when I asked him about his origin. The implication was that they were politically Taiwanese and ethnically Chinese. DPP members seldom refer to the Mainland with the simple Chinese language term *dalu*; they often add *Zhongguo dalu*, Chinese mainland, to emphasize that “over there” is a political entity known as China. In other words, Taiwan is not part of *Zhongguo* China. These nuances in language, however, are quite uncommon among the general populace.

In fact, I found that such activities of an intellectual elite leading the independence movement and constructing new definitions to terms much in keeping with movements of the past. For example, the May Fourth iconoclastic cultural movement of the 1920s was led by an intellectual elite intent on destroying the old Confucian system and searching for some replacement. This aspect of China’s political culture has even deeper roots in a Confucian society that extolled education and tended to leave societal leadership to the “smart” more than the strong. Even Confucius established his philosophy by carefully redefining terms such as “nobleman.”⁴⁵ In the same way, then, leaders of the independence movement are trying to carefully construct terms such as nation, state, and race, performing etymological surgery to sever a political unit from the cultural and ethnic unit of Greater China.

In the political realm, others are discovering more modern methods of manipulation associated with the political culture of democracy: making an emotional appeal to a population of “victims.” Linda Gail Arrigo remarks on Taiwanese politics, “In a recurrent pattern, local notables arose and garnered a popular following through vociferous oratory damning governmental exploitation and cultural suppression of the Taiwanese, but then traded that popular support for government-appointed office, or mitigated their vituperation in the face of monetary inducement and police threat.”⁴⁶ In several conversations, DPP and independence leaders were quick to point out to me that the KMT “imposed” the speaking of Mandarin, rather than Taiwanese, in schools, thereby oppressing and disadvantaging the native

Taiwanese. I began bringing this point up with interviewees while conducting my survey, and discovered no indignant feelings for being forced to speak Mandarin in school. Language is certainly a powerful tool in establishing cultural identity and stirring up independence support; using the Taiwanese language for public discourse, previously restricted from use in media as well as in school and government, is now quite in vogue. DPP members often intentionally speak Taiwanese on the floor of the Legislative Yuan. This appears to be something of a fad, however, and does not necessarily indicate society is moving toward formal independence; after all, Hong Kong uses the local Cantonese dialect in the media while remaining "Chinese."

Author Wu Nai-teh, also of Academia Sinica's Institute of Sociology, in discussing provincial consciousness, political support and national identity, points out that national identity has both an emotional and rational aspect. Some people get their "feeling of ultimate worth," their sense of belonging from their choice of national identity, while others consider choice of national identity to be a rational consideration of self-benefit. The former he identifies as having a true "national identity," the second as making a "national choice."⁴⁷ Wachman also points out the nebulous nature of identity: the sense of belonging one feels in an imagined community is a vague alliance – "a consciously constructed view of oneself in relation to others with whom one perceives a commonality."⁴⁸

Wu took into consideration both types of national identity when constructing a 1992 survey on attitudes toward unification. Rather than ask the straightforward question about supporting independence or unification, he attached conditions that spoke to the rational side as well: (1) "Some people say, 'If after Taiwan proclaims independence and changes into a nation it could maintain peaceful relationships with the PRC, then Taiwan ought to become independent and change into a new nation (*guojia*). Do you support/agree with their thinking?" (2) "Some people say, 'If in economic, social, and political aspects Taiwan and Mainland conditions are suitable, then the two coasts ought to unify. Do you support/agree with their thinking?" Because the questions are separate, of course, he was able to measure the overlap. He labels those who support independence and oppose unification as having "Taiwanese identity," those supporting unification and opposing independence as having "Chinese identity," and the overlap as having dual identity. From this we can see that 36.7% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the first question on a conditional declaration of independence, but only 9.3% of those opposed unification. On the other hand, a full two-thirds supported conditional unification in answering the second question, while 38% of those supporting unification opposed independence. The overlap of those supporting both unification and independence stood at 25%. The results of this poll follow:

Taiwan People's National Identity, 1992 (Wu Nai-teh)⁴⁹

| | Support Unification | No Opinion on Unification | Oppose Unification | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| Support Independence | 311 (25%) | 29 (2%) | 116 (9.3%) | 456 (36.7%) |
| No Opinion on Independence | 45 (3.6%) | 82 (6.6%) | 12 (1.0%) | 139 (11.2%) |
| Oppose Independence | 472 (38%) | 39 (3.1%) | 137 (11%) | 648 (52.1%) |
| Totals | 828 (66.6%) | 150 (12.1%) | 265 (21.3%) | 1243 (100%) |

Michael Hsiao, another researcher at the Institute of Sociology in Academia Sinica, reports that there is a recent trend in these numbers toward independence. While the "Social Change Survey of 1992" revealed 25.6% of respondents approved of conditional Taiwanese independence, the 1994 poll revealed that 32% approved. Numbers of unification supporters appear to be declining: in 1992, 56.9% approved of conditional unification with China, while that figure dropped to 33.7% in 1994. He summarizes "though declared independence is not necessarily perceived as a viable immediate future for Taiwan, more and more residents of Taiwan have challenged the mythified view that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the two should be unified following the PRC's terms."⁵⁰ I suspect the change in numbers is related to the perception of the two coast relationships, which is illustrated in Chart 1. As the PRC is viewed as more hostile to Taiwan, respondents are less likely to support unification even under favorable conditions *when asked in a poll*. Higher public awareness of the independence issue due to increased public debate of the topic has also probably increased support for independence, though it has not decreased the percentage solidly for unification.

Wu further analyzes his results by comparing opinions to respondents' provincial origin, shown in the table below. *Bensheng* provide the greater percentage supporting independence, although still only a minority do so. They also constitute a greater percentage as compared to *waisheng* in the overlap area of supporting both. *Waisheng*, on the other hand, strongly support unification and oppose independence. Overall, Wu notes that this evidence shows a strong correlation between provincial origin (of the family, as one will recall that a *waisheng* may be a person born and raised on Taiwan, but whose family came over in 1949), and attitude toward independence or unification, which Wu equates with national identity. He also emphasizes the importance of "ethnic" consciousness, defining *bensheng* and *waisheng* as two different ethnic groups, in determining national identity, political party support, and political activity.

I believe one must be careful, however, in placing too much importance on such a distinction. Though Wu's survey, along with others, certainly points to a significant difference between the two groups, time will only erode the difference. The generation that came over in 1949 is beyond the politically active age, and those "*waisheng*" born and raised on Taiwan are more likely to have different viewpoints. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the distinction

between the two groups is not nearly as important as in the recent past. Several interviewees related to me that formerly at social functions, one of the first items of information exchanged was status as *waisheng* or *bensheng*; now, in some circles it is even considered impolite to categorize another person as such. In the past one might also easily know another's background by accent; now, all speak an indistinguishable "Taiwanese Mandarin."

The final table on the following page provides a good summary of the elements of identity of Taiwan-centered and Mainland-centered identity.

Taiwan People's National Identity and Provincial Origin, 1992 (Wu Nai-teh)⁵¹

| | Support Unfication | | No Opinion | | Oppose Unfication | | Totals | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|----------------|---------------|
| | Ben sheng | Wai sheng | Ben sheng | Wai sheng | Ben sheng | Wai sheng | Ben sheng | Wai sheng |
| Support Independence | 26.7% | 15.8% | 2.4% | 2.0% | 10.4% | 7% | 39.5% | 18.5% |
| No Opinion on Independence | 4.1% | 0% | 7.2% | 3.3% | 1% | 7% | 12.3% | 4% |
| Oppose Independence | 34.6% | 62.4% | 3.2% | 3.3% | 10.5% | 11.8% | 48.2% | 77.6% |
| Totals | 65.4% | 78.3% | 12.8% | 8.6% | 21.9% | 13.2% | 100% (1076) | 100% (152) |

Change in Public Opinion on Attitudes Toward Independence and Unification From Public Opinion Polls*

從民意測驗看台灣民衆的統獨輿論之變化

Comparison of Chinese Consciousness and Taiwanese Consciousness

| Emotional Attachment | Chinese Consciousness | Taiwanese Consciousness |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Recognition Ethnic Origin | All are <i>Huaren</i> 華人, also of the <i>Han</i> race | Identify with <i>Huaren</i> , but ancestors came to Taiwan 3-400 years ago have developed their own system. (Extremists advocate the theory of "Taiwanese Race/Ethnicity") |
| Native Place Attachment | Have feelings of homeland 家園 toward Taiwan, ancestral origins from the Mainland | Unfamiliar or strange toward the Mainland, "My China 中國 is on Taiwan" |
| National Territory Aspirations | Taiwan is a small island; yearn to become Chinese of a Greater China | Although Taiwan is small, it has everything required, and can develop towards the sea |
| Political Factor | KMT inherited the Chinese mainland legally constituted authority and legitimacy | The future of Taiwan ought to be decided by the 21 million people of Taiwan |
| Economic Factor | The Mainland consumer market is huge, the unification of the two coasts can provide a better future | Taiwan escaped the Mainland economic sphere 40 years ago and can self-exist |
| Cultural Factor | Except for the Taiwanese indigenous peoples, all follow Chinese culture | For 100 years Taiwan has received foreign culture and has gradually grown distant from the Mainland |
| Historical Recognition | Taiwan from ancient times has been a part of China, and is now a segment of China | During the Holland occupation, Ming Dynasty, and Japanese occupation, Taiwan was never under Chinese control. The Qing Dynasty gave up Taiwan. Taiwan should face reality, give up an "orphan" mentality and independently take responsibility for itself. |

* Translated from Liu Shengji, 劉勝驥 "Change in Public Opinion on Attitudes Toward Independence and Unification From Public Opinion Polls," "從民意測驗看台灣民衆的統獨輿論之變化," p. 123

Political Legitimacy

Questions 15, 16, and 17 on my survey all deal with political legitimacy; the first two explore internal legitimacy, while the last is intended to question perceived international legitimacy. This section appeared to be the most troublesome for respondents to understand; simply using the term "legitimate" introduces a nebulous concept that may mean different things to different people. This confusion is perhaps reflected in the 22% who refused to answer. Furthermore, one might be confused in answering my question as to what the Chinese political history and tradition is; does that mean an authoritarian regime tradition that is no longer desired, or does it simply mean a state that legitimately may rule over the population? Another problem is the use of the word "Chinese" (*Zhongguo*) in describing political history and tradition. If the respondent had a Taiwanese-centered identity, believing that Taiwan has its own political history and tradition, then China (*Zhongguo*) would represent China's political history and tradition, but could not represent Taiwan's.

Bearing in mind these considerations, my survey indicates that most feel both the Mainland and Taiwan represent China's political history and tradition. The government, unsurprisingly, is perceived as the institution best representing China's political history and tradition, while respondents were not generally willing to admit that the media and the Chinese mafia represent that tradition. Those that identified the Mainland or both as the best representative of political history expressed that China's tradition is very much associated with place—one might think of the Great Wall, Beijing's Forbidden City, Suzhou's Canals, Xi'an's imperial tombs—that have an emotional pull even to those who have never visited the Mainland. Though I am not satisfied that the question as understood by respondents adequately addressed this, the government on Taiwan is probably seen only as the legitimate representative of Taiwanese people, not the entire Chinese population, even though until recently, the Taiwanese state (KMT) myth was that it was the legitimate heir of the government of all of China. Very few, if any, see the Mainland state—the communist government—as a legitimate successor to rule the Chinese people. This is especially true since true democratic reforms have swept Taiwan.

The concept of legitimacy on Taiwan, because of these reforms, has probably undergone some change. As discussed in the political culture section, Chinese society has traditionally emphasized order and harmony above individual expression. Uniformity, not pluralism, was the societal norm. In order to be legitimate, a state must be able to keep order. This attitude still persists; however, western influence and democratic development have created an additional, even if sometimes contradictory, expectation of the state in order to be considered legitimate: it must be responsive to public opinion through the ballot box. This sense of legitimacy was not entirely missing in traditional Chinese political systems; theoretically, the Confucian leader would always keep the welfare of the people foremost in his mind. This coincides with Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles, which have been promoted by the state and accepted by most of the populace as giving legitimacy to the state that carries them out. Now, however, even though the Mainland government keeps order, and claims to keep the interests of the people foremost, the Taiwanese do not see it as legitimate because of its repressive nature and lack of democracy. Should the PRC government become democratic, however, the strong

connection between place and legitimacy suggests that unification would still be the ultimate choice of most Taiwanese.

Interesting indirect evidence that the KMT enjoys a greater sense of legitimacy than ever before among the population (and that it does not, as a class of "victims," particularly blame the government for its problems) comes from a poll on happiness conducted by the Chinese Magazine *Tianhsia*. The poll asked two basic questions: "Do you feel yourself happy?" and "Do you feel yourself successful?" Over 50% responded either happy or extremely happy, 4.5% unhappy or extremely unhappy. On the other hand, only 18.6% felt successful, 22.7% felt unsuccessful. When asked "What is the most important reason that you feel you have not been able to fulfill your expectations?" most identified their own lack of ability or effort (16.1% said lack of ability, 35.6% lack of effort). Of those choices given respondents that might be construed as external causes influenced by the government that limited self-fulfillment, 22% identified "the times and society have changed too fast," and 22.5% chose "the work environment provided no opportunity to develop."⁵² One might surmise that Taiwanese are basically satisfied with their life now, though still working toward "success."⁵³ If they feel unsuccessful in some area, they tend not to blame external causes, but themselves. This can be taken as a sign of satisfaction with the current situation.

The question on perceived international legitimacy poses problems in that many think that the world should see Taiwan as the legitimate successor to Chinese civilization, yet realize that in actuality they don't. I believe some answered what they thought should be the case, while others answered what they perceived the actual case to be. As evidence that most Taiwanese are willing to view the government as legitimate on the world stage, polls show that most Taiwanese support Lee's attempt to have Taiwan re-admitted into the United Nations. This legitimacy only applies to the 21 million people on Taiwan, however.

Perhaps the most important point in discussing legitimacy concerns negotiations between Taiwan and China over the relationship between the two coasts. In the past, any negotiations were simply between two authoritarian regimes; the political elite on either side made decisions without much consideration to public opinion. This can no longer be the case for the KMT after democratization. Those supporting independence and opposing unification under any circumstance are now a significant portion of the population and cannot be ignored by the elite. If authorities were to strike a deal with the PRC, the KMT opposition would feel "sold out," and major civil unrest, probably open rebellion, would result. The independence question can no longer be legitimately decided by two parties of authoritarian political elite.

Independence or Unification

Now having an extensive background on Taiwanese history and society, we may better understand the context of the polls on independence versus unification. Most polls, such as mine, do not give any conditions or explanation to the direct question, "Do you support independence, unification, or continuation of the present situation?" Though one must make survey questions as simple as possible, this simple formulation may pose several problems. First, one may ask what "independence" means: some may feel that Taiwan is already independent, and prefer that situation, yet oppose any action such as a formal announcement

that might provoke a PRC military reaction. An unconditional question leaves it up to the respondent to imagine whether independence means war with the Mainland, or if unification means prior to or after democratization of the Mainland. Finally, if one chooses "continue the present situation," that gives no indication whether he or she prefers eventual unification or eventual independence, or either depending on the situation.

My survey results agree with most others that find the greatest support for the present situation. 52% preferred the status quo, 16% opted for unification and 18% for independence. Although I did not start inquiring until my survey was nearly finished, I found that most respondents answer status quo preferred eventual unification, which follows data from other polls.

Organizations that take separate polls over time show that support of unification or independence depend to a great extent on international events, particularly on PRC actions. This is particularly true over the last year from Lee Tenghui's visit to the US to his re-election as president this March. The PRC over that time period held intimidating military exercises with live long-range missile tests, cancelled talks with Taiwan, and unceasingly villified Lee as a supporter of an independent Taiwan. In the short run, this may have had intended results for the PRC: the electorate obviously rejected Peng Minming and his outspoken stance for independence, and the fallout from the election has torn apart the opposition and various camps supporting independence. The latest trend, however, has seen increased support, or at least increased acceptance of, a future with the possibility of independence. Meanwhile, the percentage of those who answer that they prefer unification (probably meaning that they prefer unification sooner rather than later) has remained steady. Perhaps this only reflects an increase in the willingness of many to *consider* independence, and not that they actually desire that situation. The increased acceptance of independence corresponding with perceptions of hostility from the Mainland demonstrates that Beijing may be convincing the Taiwanese they are better off going on their own.

Summary and Trends in Taiwan

In summary, what can be surmised about the present state and the future prospects for the Independence Movement in Taiwanese society? Historically speaking, the popular notion that Taiwan could be a separate nation-state is fairly recent, stemming mostly from internal social, economic and political changes and from international pressures that have made Taiwan's status *vis a vis* the PRC ambiguous and tenuous. Independence advocates emphasize the *de facto* independence of Taiwan over the past century and call for formal procedures to recognize the situation. Using reasoned arguments, they have yet to overcome the strong emotional connection and sense of belonging that most Taiwanese feel toward Chinese civilization, though the sense of being Taiwanese as well as Chinese has grown over recent years. Politicians making emotional appeals to Taiwanese, attempting to open their eyes to their oppression and propagandizing by the KMT, with a few exceptions, have met little success. Examining the political culture of Taiwan reveals little support for ideological causes; most of the population is too busy trying to make money to join a cause that might disrupt economic development.

Trends, however, show an increasing sense of distance from the Mainland, particularly if the Mainland continues its present hard line. In reality, Taiwan is independent of the Mainland; the question is whether the Taiwanese will ever want to become a part of the Mainland. Increasing contact through modern communications to the rest of the world, particularly the western nations, may have their effect on Taiwanese society as well. Individualism may become more prevalent under the influence of western media and economic affluence. As many Taiwanese reach a certain economic level, perhaps the current breathless pursuit of wealth will give way to a search for moral or spiritual values—as many societies have reached a certain level of prosperity, some segments in that society have asked, "What next?" in expectation of something more fulfilling. In this way, Taiwanese society could indeed become more ideological, perhaps willing to support the cause of independence.

REACTIONS TO THE TAIWANESE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT: THE PRC AND US POSITIONS

The PRC Position

Many years ago, in the 1930s, Mao Zedong had listed those countries with which China would have friendly relations after liberation; Taiwan was one of those countries. State enemy Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to the island in 1949 changed Mao's attitude toward Taiwan, and it now became a matter of policy that Taiwan was a part of China that needed to be recovered. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China was more internally-focused on its own political struggles. However, after the beginning of economic liberalization and development under Deng, the newly emerging power of China sought to flex its muscle. Domestic calls for reform and a perception of a lack of order because of the shedding of ideological straightjacket of socialism may also account for PRC promotion of nationalism. The fight over Taiwan's attempt to re-enter the UN, presently unsupported by the United States, is evidence of this assertion of Chinese power. PRC authorities often cite UN Resolution 2758 from 1971, which "restored all of China's legitimate rights and interests to the PRC and expelled the "representative" of the Taiwan authorities." Furthermore, the PRC insists that the Taiwanese matter is an internal affair, and that the UN charter stipulates "The UN and its members shall not infringe on the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."⁵⁴ Charges against interference are most often directed toward the United States, and links the Taiwan problem with other issues such as copyright infringement, weapons sales, and human rights. PRC President Yang Shangkun in 1991 provides typical rhetoric on the PRC position toward Taiwan:

"There are indeed some foreign forces that are instigating the Taiwan independence elements to split the motherland, so that they could exploit the opportunity. I would like to reiterate solemnly that Taiwan has been Chinese territory since ancient times, and to reunify the motherland is an internal affair of China, which we will absolutely not permit any foreign forces to interfere with. We will never sit idly by and watch any act of separating Taiwan from China. If Taiwan is separated from China, it will have no way out, and will inevitably be seized by certain foreign forces. I would like to warn sternly the handful of splittist, who hanker after Taiwan independence, not to make a wrong appraisal of the situation. Whoever plays with fire will perish by fire. . . ."⁵⁵

In January, 1995, before Lee visited the US, it appeared that PRC-Taiwan relationships would improve after leader Jiang Zemin made an "Eight Point" speech with a few conciliatory remarks (including the remark that "Chinese don't fight Chinese"). Some Chinese experts speculate that internal dissatisfaction, particularly among the military, with Jiang for taking a softer stand toward Taiwan contributed to the excessive reaction to Lee's visit and military intimidation throughout Taiwan's election season. Jiang faces a struggle for control of the communist party apparatus at the imminent passing away of Deng Xiaoping, and cannot afford to look weak on the subject.

A New Hard Line on Taiwan?

Consequently, in November, 1995, a new line on what might provoke a PRC military attack of Taiwan came out. Previously, Beijing claimed the conditions leading to military action included a formal declaration of independence, internal unrest, or foreign interference in Taiwan. The Communist Party's leading group on Taiwan Affairs, headed by Jiang Zemin, announced that the criterion for some form of military action against the Lee administration included now: *covert* independence, the 'purposeful perpetuation of a state of division' of the motherland, or deliberate procrastination of reunification talks with the mainland. An increasing role for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was in this line. The new slogan of generals is, "A small-scale military action against a small-scale independence movement; full-scale action against a full-blown (independence) movement."⁵⁶ This rhetoric was only part of the military intimidation leading up to parliamentary and presidential elections in Taiwan, but indicates that the PRC may be less and less willing to accept a *de facto* as well as a *de jure* independent Taiwan.

The PRC's new hard line toward the Taiwan Independence Movement could be due to several reasons. According to one China expert, Beijing uses military exercises to play on insecurities of the new middle class, who lack confidence in the ROC government's ability to deal with an external threat. Beijing wants to see fundamental changes in Taipei's policies and leadership; curbing President Lee's efforts to seek international recognition for the Republic of China (ROC) is not all they want to do. They also wish to undercut popular support for Lee, who they claim is promoting Taiwan as a sovereign state independent of China.⁵⁷

The PRC position could be related to internal problems as well. I have mentioned the turn toward nationalism to replace a decrepit socialist ideology, but Beijing, by getting tough on Taiwan, may be sending messages to Hong Kong, Canton, Fujian, Shanghai and any other high-growth areas that may have independent minds.

The ROC's Foreign Policy and the PRC

As for the Taiwanese side of relations with the PRC, Thomas Metzger identifies three historical tendencies in the PRC-Taiwan relationship: toward peace, PRC-Taiwan societies drawing closer, and societies diverging. According to him, these all call for 3 foreign policy goals:

1. further developing peaceful relations
2. finding an appropriate form of unification carried out under appropriate circumstances
3. protecting, developing, and further improving the Taiwan model of Chinese modernization⁵⁸

These foreign policy goals mean that Taiwan's policy of unification has to be indeterminate or open-ended and dependent on some conditions, including a vast ideological, institutional and economic transformation of the Mainland and the expressed desire of the people in Taiwan to carry out unification of an appropriate sort. Hence, Taiwan's National Unification Council's Guidelines for National Unification, approved 14 March 91, stressed the rights, interests, and

will of the Taiwanese people and transformation of the Mainland. Metzger stresses the critical nature of timing in this process: unification too fast would destroy the successful Taiwan model of modernization, while separatism might destroy the tendency toward peaceful PRC relations.

The US Position

United States national interests are best served in the western Pacific region by the development of democratic, free-market regimes and regional stability. While some criticize a policy that includes the "ethnocentric" promotion of "western" concepts of democracy, and call for the United States to concentrate on economic aspects of foreign policy, the freedom implied in a democratic system cannot be divorced from a free market. Particularly in the case of our relations with Mainland China and Taiwan, policy has often been made that seeks the economic advantage of entering the elusive China market, while neglecting other considerations. Taiwan is also economically important to the United States (she is the US' 6th largest trading partner, and the US exported \$17 billion to Taiwan as opposed to \$8.8 billion to PRC in 1994), is a reliable ally in the region and has become one of the most democratized systems in East Asia.

The basic US position on Taiwan is stated in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, accompanied by several communiques. First and foremost, these official pronouncements call for peace and stability in the region. The US has until now supported the official Chinese position (of both sides) that "China is one and that Taiwan is a part of China"—hence, we necessarily broke off official relations with Taiwan in 1979 when recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of China. Of course, realistically we did not abandon Taiwan to the whims of Beijing, and our position since 1979 has been intentionally ambiguous. We must walk a thin line between guaranteeing US military support no matter what Taiwan does and giving Beijing the appearance that we will not defend Taiwan in the case of a forcible takeover. In the light of democratic changes to Taiwan, and in recognition of the reality of an independent and sovereign Taiwan, I believe the US should adjust its support of the fiction that China is necessarily one and that Taiwan is a part of China. I will address this further after discussing other views on the US position.

Protecting the Taiwan Model

According to Metzger, the US should support the three goals of promoting peaceful relations, eventual reunification, and protecting and developing the Taiwan model of Chinese modernization. The third one is the tricky one—protection must be weighed against cultivating good relations with PRC. "As we thus weigh it, however, our scales should give us an accurate reading undistorted by the still fashionable bias against the KMT regime and in favor of the CCP regime."⁵⁹ The PRC may have some characteristics of a modernizing, pragmatic regime, but it is still Marxist.

"It thus combines any pragmatic tendencies with a self-interested determination to protect its statist and tyrannical model of national development, no matter what the evidence that a fundamentally different model would greatly increase the freedom and prosperity of the huge population living under it. Such an increase is not its

prime concern. . . . Americans, therefore, should no longer regard the KMT regime as an embarrassing historical leftover. It is the KMT regime, not the CCP regime, which they should think of as in accord with American values and exhibiting pragmatic organizational modes offering more hope to the Chinese people than any others that have been historically tested."⁶⁰

Kenneth Lieberthal, in the *Foreign Affairs* article "A New China Strategy," states "The contradiction between fundamental values and concrete national interests has troubled American foreign policy since the beginning of the Republic. The Cold War enabled the United States to sidestep the issue; anticommunism was perceived as having sufficient moral weight to permit America to engage in almost any form of realpolitik to combat the Soviet empire."⁶¹ In the post-Cold War world, we face a dilemma in supporting small but democratic - capitalist Taiwan against the realpolitik of getting along with the major power in East Asia, communist China. Recently Congress has tended to take the high moral stand of supporting Taiwan, while the Executive Branch and State Department tend to play the realpolitik game. In my view, supporting Taiwan with military sales and diplomatic support will serve both ideological and practical purposes.

In "US Reactions to the PRC Use of Force," Mark S. Pratt speculates that the DPP is likely to call on US support invoking popular principals such as sovereignty, self-determination, and legalism. Self-determination is a sticky problem, however. Though support for Taiwan is likely to increase because of democratic changes, "few are prepared to see the replacement of a working (at least for now) *modus vivendi* in favor of conflict based on principles that, however high-sounding, have in recent years been frequently found troublesome."⁶² The Baltic states' "independence," as well as refusal by the US to recognize Kurds as a separate population, are perfect examples of US willingness to sacrifice principle for practicality. This means that the US may be unlikely to regard Taiwanese as a separate people with a right to self-determination. However, Pratt also notes the 1982 US-China Communique stated US arms sales to Taiwan would "not exceed in qualitative or quantitative terms the level of those supplied in recent years . . . and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan." But this is predicated on Chinese policy of peaceful unification--military exercises and Beijing belligerence may change this.

The recent presidential elections in Taiwan focused national attention on the US policy toward Taiwan and prompted several US actions that clarified our commitment to Taiwan. While sending two carrier task forces to the Western Pacific in response to Beijing's military intimidation, Defense Secretary William Perry remarked that they would remind China that the US "is the strongest military power in the western Pacific." Not everyone agreed on the US approach to the independence movement. In a March, 1995 New York Times editorial, James Shinn declared, "The White House should state clearly . . . that if Taiwan declares independence, count us out; if China invades, count us in." On the other hand, when queried at a speech approximately the same time period, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated, "I would recommend that if Taiwan unequivocally decides that it wants to be an independent nation, and completely free of any control or domination or idea of reunifying with China, that that would be a decision we would respect. And if that involves a change of

American policy, so be it." Congress in general supported Taiwan's position, and some raised questions about our current policy. Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL) suggested, "The reality is we ought to treat China and Taiwan like we did West Germany and East Germany."

In my opinion, the United States should indeed adjust its policy on Taiwan, continuing to provide her arms and recognition in the United Nations. In preventing a hegemonic Chinese power disturbing the peaceful balance in the Western Pacific, this policy would serve the same function that supporting the divided nations West Germany and South Korea in the United Nations has served. It sends a message that the US is serious about supporting pro-democratic, pro-capitalist allies against aggression. It should also send a needed message to Beijing that the PRC may not lay claim to any territory that was at some historical point part of China, and that it cannot arbitrarily lay claim to the right to govern any ethnically or linguistically Chinese group. The US should recognize the unique historical circumstances of a Taiwan that has been independent of Mainland China for 100 years, supporting the self-determination of Taiwan's 21 million people. This of course must be done without provoking hostilities or a chaotic world situation in which any group wishing to declare independence from a larger entity thinks it can rely on US support. The reality of the situation is that Taiwan is an independent, democratic, sovereign nation that is currently an important economic partner with a developed capitalist market and is willing to be a strong ally of the United States. The PRC, on the other hand, is a repressive non-democratic regime with an elusive, non-capitalist market that will not in the near term either establish truly friendly relations with the US or promote her interests in the region. Taiwan is not likely to declare formal independence in the near future. But if it is continually refused international recognition that it desires, the population will feel more isolated and indignant, perhaps willing to support formal independence. By helping Taiwan to gain international recognition, the US will preserve Taiwan as an ally and appropriate model for Chinese political and economic modernization.

Conclusions

Democratization in Taiwan, as well as economic development and the growth of a wealthy middle class, will create increasingly divergent societies across the Straits. The Independence Movement, now mostly represented by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other splinter groups, has slowly but steadily gained popularity and legitimacy, particularly in the recent rapid democratization in Taiwan. Supporters of formal independence consist of societal elements not presently politically powerful, such as the lower-income class, an intellectual elite, and opposition politicians seeking to use social discontent to secure votes. Pro-independence citizens are still in the minority, and will likely remain so for some time, especially in the face of military threats from Mainland China. Although the newly wealthy middle class and business interests in Taiwan do not seem to favor independence at this time, preferring stability in all international relationships, neither will they accept reunification with an oppressive Communist regime. Polls show a steady percentage (about 17%) solidly supporting unification, while the number supporting independence, or willing to consider it, has increased recently. Perhaps what keeps more Taiwanese from supporting the Independence Movement is mostly the threat of invasion from the Mainland and the perception that Taiwan would be ruined either in a takeover or in the resistance attempt. If the perception should change that Taiwan could be militarily strong enough to declare independence (perhaps with the perception that the US would militarily support Taiwan), and if the Mainland continues to be run by authoritarian regimes, perhaps that middle class will support independence.

Nationalism—a fervent, emotional appeal to unite a people through a common language, culture, ethnicity, or through the state creation of other bonds— is becoming increasingly important in the entire region. Nationalism can work either for reunification of Mandarin speaking Chinese seeking a "Greater China," or for independence of an increasingly divergent political culture on Taiwan. Polls on cultural identity show that most Taiwanese have a strong sense of Chinese identity and hence feel connected to the Mainland; however, identity as Taiwanese has increased recently as well, particularly in reaction to an aggressive PRC policy. The political culture and cultural identity of Taiwanese is presently undergoing rapid transformation, probably linked to both economic and political changes. The leaders on both sides of the Straits may use nationalism to boost their support as they face difficulties at home. Lee Teng-hui must deal with a powerful, vocal opposition, and Jiang Zemin faces difficulty with the military and a power struggle after Deng passes away. They are both likely to use nationalist rhetoric and less likely to compromise on either the position of winning international recognition and prestige for Taiwan (though this is short of independence for now), or maintaining authoritarian political order while developing economically for Mainland China. Particularly in communist China's case, we may not expect entirely "rational" approaches from an international perspective, if belligerence against Taiwan is seen to bolster Jiang's image.

The PRC has reacted to the independence movement with increasing nationalist rhetoric. It has not changed its position on Taiwan independence, considering it an internal matter of national sovereignty, and in fact has taken an increasingly tough stance on the matter, perhaps due to increasing influence of the hard-line PLA in PRC domestic politics. The use of military

exercises and threats, including the firing of live ammunition in close proximity to the island, constitutes a dangerous heightening of tension. The possibility of shots fired in anger between the two sides increases with each exercise held by the Communists.

The US should be concerned over this situation of heightening tension over Taiwanese independence, yet should support the democratic changes going on in Taiwan. We should maintain our stance of letting the two sides work out the matter among themselves, but we have an overwhelming interest in preventing the outbreak of hostilities, due to key economic ties with Taiwan and the PRC and to the US interest in maintaining regional stability (e.g. the implications for North and South Korea). The most likely outbreak of hostilities involves a Mainland invasion of Taiwan. In order to prevent this from happening, we should support the continuing democratic process and economic growth in Taiwan, without specifically supporting an independence movement. The US should also encourage engagement between the Mainland and Taiwan, through economic and other ties. However, we must make it extremely clear to Mainland China that we will not tolerate an invasion of Taiwan, that we will honor our obligations in the Taiwan Relations Act, and that we will promote our interest in maintaining peace, stability, and democratic governments in the region. A tough stance now lessens the possibility of actually having to use force later, as the assurance of US aid during an invasion of Taiwan should make the potential cost much too high for Communist leaders contemplating an invasion. This requires a delicate balance, however, in which we do not encourage a radical independence movement with promises of military aid that would surely provoke an attack from the Mainland.

Nonetheless, we should recognize the reality of one of the world's most complex political situations: Taiwan is an independent, sovereign nation with a clearly defined population, territory, political and economic system, and military. At some point in the future, it may reunite with the Mainland to form a Greater China, or it may decide to continue as an independent island nation. The current transformation of the identity of the people on Taiwan makes this future unclear, but the US as a matter of principle and practicality should respect the will of the Taiwanese population and not abandon them to the whims of Beijing. Continued or increased arms sales to Taiwan and support for international recognition will promote US interests in preserving Taiwan as a democratic, capitalist-market ally and model for Chinese economic and political development.

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- Chen Jun-lin, Deputy Executive Director, Democratic Progressive Party Election Strategy Committee, 23 July 1996.
- Ho Dwanfan, Director, Democratic Progressive Party Survey Center, 24 July 1996.
- Chang Mau-kuei Michael, Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica and Adjunct Professor of Sociology, Taiwan University and Tsin-Hua University, 20-21 August, 1996.
- Lin Cho-Shui, Legislator, Legislative Yuan, Democratic Progressive Party, 21 August, 1996.
- Hsiao Hsin-Huang Michael, Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica; Associate Director, Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Academia Sinica; Professor, Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University, 21 August 1996.
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- Shi Ming-Teh, Senator, Legislative Yuan, 27 August 1996.
- Mu Ming-Chu, Deputy Director-General, Department of Cultural Affairs, Kuomintang, 29 August, 1996.

APPENDIX

SURVEY RESULT SUMMARY

SURVEY RESULT CHARTS

INTERVIEW LETTER

OPINION SURVEY

OUTLINE, TALK ON THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS, SPRING 1996

SURVEY RESULT SUMMARY

| Survey no. | sex | profession | age | hometown | parental origin | marital status | education level | party affiliation |
|------------|-----|---------------------------|-----|-----------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|---|
| 1. | M | Waiter | 25 | 彰化(中) | 台灣省 | N | college | none |
| 2. | M | Technology | 25 | 高雄 | 台灣省 | n | college | New Party-Gives Taiwan a new voice |
| 3. | F | Arts Center Accountant | 28 | 雲林S | 台灣 | n | b.a. | New Party-relatively clean |
| 4. | F | Art Gallery | 28 | 新竹縣 | 台灣 | n | college | DPP-Change policy, thought (views) on racial harmony, etc. |
| 5. | M | Hotel Service | 22 | | 外省 | n | h.s. | none, no reason |
| 6. | F | Hotel Service | 35 | 台灣省 | 外省 | y | h.s. | |
| 7. | F | Accounting | 46 | 台北 | 台灣省 | y | h.s. | none |
| 8. | M | Executive Assistant | 49 | 台灣省 | 台灣省 | y | masters | none, Never voted |
| 9. | F | Teacher | 31 | 台北 | 江蘇, 浙江 | y | b.a. | none |
| 10. | F | Teacher | 35 | 台灣省 | 外省 | y | masters | KMT-stability |
| 11. | F | Student | 19 | 台北 | 台灣省 | n | college | none |
| 12. | M | Business | 27 | 彰化C | 台灣省 | n | u niversity | none-choose the person, not the party |
| 13. | F | Assistant (business?) | 20 | 三重 (台北) | 台灣省 | n | high school | none |
| 14. | F | Service | 25 | 北部 | 台灣省 | n | h.s. | KMT, source of today's (positive) situation |
| 15. | M | Sales | 35 | | 台南 | y | h.s. | none |
| 16. | M | Government | 36 | 台灣省 | 台灣省 | y | university | none |
| 17. | M | Sales | 30 | 台北 | 台北 | n | university | none |
| 18. | F | Teacher | 28 | 台北 | 台灣 | n | university | none-particular |
| 19. | F | Research Asst | 26 | 台灣 | 外省 | n | masters | DPP, Has always supported DPP |
| 20. | M | Grad Student | 26 | 台灣屏東 (南部) | 台灣 | n | masters | DPP, Too many reasons |
| 21. | F | Business Sect'y / student | 30 | 台灣 | 大陸 | y | bachelors | None, No matter what each party's "color" has weak / imperfect points. Besides power and greed are too strong |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|-----------------------------------|----|-----|--------------------|---|---------------|---|
| 22. | M | Computer Graphics | 28 | 台灣 | 台灣 | n | bachelors | I support the individual person in the government who has the attitude of taking care of business. |
| 23. | M | HS Student | 17 | 台北 | 台灣 | n | HS | KMT (tell they do things OK (big up)) |
| 24. | F | housewife | 64 | 台北 | 台灣 | y | middle school | KMT |
| 25. | F | none | 23 | 台北 | 爸：山東 媽：福建 台灣 | n | university | lean toward (New Party) |
| 26. | F | teacher | 28 | 台北 | 台灣 | y | university | Don't particularly support a party, but I always hope every party in conducting political activities and making policies can earnestly contemplate Taiwan's future with reason and rationality. |
| 27. | M | retail-dept store | 27 | 日本 | 台灣 | n | university | none |
| 28. | F | public | 28 | 台灣 | 本省 | n | college | none |
| 29. | M | public service | 45 | 台北 | 父：浙江 母：江蘇 | y | university | KMT |
| 30. | M | business | 34 | 金門 | 山東 | n | college | none—they're all too selfish |
| 31. | M | incense factory owner | 46 | 台北 | 爸：南京 媽：台灣 | y | high school | none—never voted, it's no use |
| 32. | M | student | 18 | 花蓮 | 台灣 | n | college | none—because I select the person, not the party. I choose whoever has ability and tolerance |
| 33. | F | business | 43 | | | y | high school | no answer |
| 34. | M | communication | 50 | 台灣 | 台灣 | y | high school | none |
| 35. | M | business | 44 | 北部 | 本省 | y | middle school | no answer |
| 36. | M | public service | 33 | 花蓮 | 台灣 | y | high school | KMT |
| 37. | M | writes legal documents for others | 38 | 屏東縣 | 台灣 | y | college | KMT |
| 38. | M | teacher | 56 | 台灣 | 台灣 | y | doctor | no answer |
| 39. | F | public | 29 | 桃園 | 台灣 | n | college | New Party—family believe that Taiwan cannot declare independence |


| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|----------------------------|----|----|--------------|---|-------------|-------------------------|
| 40. | F | college student | 19 | 台北 | 福建 | n | university | none |
| 41. | F | business | 28 | 台北 | 台灣 | y | university | none |
| 42. | M | business/professional work | 30 | 宜蘭 | 台灣 | y | high school | none |
| 43. | F | none | 24 | 臺中 | 台灣 | n | university | none |
| 44. | M | worker | 40 | 台南 | 台灣 | y | high school | no answer |
| 45. | M | worker | 30 | 台北 | 台灣 | n | high school | no party, no faction |
| 46. | M | none-searching | 27 | 宜蘭 | 台灣 | n | university | no particular party |
| 47. | F | student | 20 | 新竹 | 廣東 | n | university | none |
| 48. | F | student | 19 | 台灣 | 台南 | n | high school | don't belong to a party |
| 49. | M | noodle shop owner | 45 | 宜蘭 | 台灣 | y | high school | KMT |
| 50. | F | teacher | 31 | 桃園 | 爸：浙江 媽：福建 | n | university | none |

Summary

| Sex | Age | Hometown | Parent's Origin | Marriage Status | Education | Party Affiliation |
|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|---|------------------|---|---|
| Male: 26 Female: 24 | Avg: 31.8 Taiwan: 17 | Taipei or Northern Taiwan: 17 | Taiwan - 36 Mainland - 12 Both - 1 Unknown - 1 | N - 28 Y - 22 | PhD - 1 Masters - 4 University - 18 College - 9 High School - 16 Middle School - 2 | None - 30 No Answer - 5 KMT - 8 New Party - 4 DPP - 3 |

9. Government's most important responsibility


| Survey no. | Freedom | Security | National Defense | Welfare | Econ Development |
|------------|---------|----------|------------------|---------|------------------|
| 1 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| 2 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 3 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 7 |
| 4 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 6 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 10 |
| 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 8 | 6 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 10 |
| 9 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 6 |
| 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 11 | 10 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| 12 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 13 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 14 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 15 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 16 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 17 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 |
| 18 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 19 | 10 | 3 | 5 | 8 | 6 |
| 20 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| 21 | 6 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 22 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 10 |
| 23 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 24 | 1 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 10 |
| 25 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 8 |
| 26 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 27 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 10 |
| 28 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 29 | 3 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| 30 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 |
| 31 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 32 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 7 |
| 33 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 10 |
| 34 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| 35 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 9 |
| 37 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 38 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 39 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 40 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 8 |
| 41 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 42 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 10 |
| 43 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 |
| 44 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 45 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 46 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| 47 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 48 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 49 | 1 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 50 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| mean | 7.3 | 9.56 | 8.72 | 8.78 | 8.92 |



10. Influences on Political Attitudes

| | Media | Party | Family | religion | school | college | military | boss | colleagues |
|------|-------|-------|--------|----------|-----------|---------|------------|------|------------|
| 1. | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 5 |
| 2. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 3. | 7 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 7 |
| 4. | 9 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| 5. | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 6. | 6 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 7. | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 8. | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| 9. | 9 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| 10. | 8 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 11. | 9 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| 12. | 10 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 13. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 14. | 8 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 15. | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| 16. | 8 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 17. | 8 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 18. | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 19. | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 |
| 20. | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 21. | 7 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 22. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | media | gov't | family | religion | education | boss | colleagues | | |
| 23. | 7 | 9 | 10 | 4 | 10 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 24. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 25. | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 26. | 5 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 3 | | |
| 27. | 10 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 7 | | |
| 28. | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 6 | | |
| 29. | 5 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 3 | | |
| 30. | 4 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 31. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 32. | 5 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 33. | 5 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 34. | 9 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 6 | | |
| 35. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 36. | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 37. | 7 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 6 | | |
| 38. | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 7 | | |
| 39. | 9 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 9 | | |
| 40. | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | | |
| 41. | 10 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 42. | 8 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 3 | | |
| 43. | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 5 | | |
| 44. | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | |
| 45. | 1 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 46. | 8 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 4 | | |
| 47. | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 5 | | |
| 48. | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | | |
| 49. | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | | |
| 50. | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 8 | | |
| Mean | 5.39 | 6.5 | 5.57 | 3.82 | 6.36 | 2.93 | 3.57 | | |

Influence on Political Attitudes



11. Self-identity

| self-identity | cultural identity |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1. East Asian | Race |
| 2. Gaohsiung Province | Hometown |
| 3. Chinese | Race |
| 4. Hakka, then Chinese | Language and Race |
| 5. Chinese | Race |
| 6. Chinese | Hometown |
| 7. Taiwanese | Race |
| 8. Taiwanese | Hometown |
| 9. East Asian, then Chinese | Father's hometown, history and culture education tradition |
| 10. Chinese | Race |
| 11. Chinese | Language |
| 12. Chinese | Race |
| 13. Taiwanese | Language |
| 14. Chinese | Race |
| 15. Chinese | Religion |
| 16. Taiwanese | Hometown, Race |
| 17. Chinese | Race |
| 18. Taiwanese | Land/Territory |
| 19. Taiwanese | Feeling of brotherhood? |
| 20. Taiwanese | Language |
| 21. Chinese | Chinese historical culture has identity |

12. Cultural Identity

| cultural identity changes | yes, individual to group identity? | yes? Follows the values point of view |
|--|---|---------------------------------------|
| yes | yes | yes |
| Yes. Racial identity has become deeper. Societal changes and political activities have made me feel a sense of belonging as a part of Chinese people and acknowledge/know the culture of other languages | Yes. Because too much liberalization has made society to chaotic | No. |
| No. | No. | No. |
| No. | No. | No. |
| yes | yes | yes |
| no | no | no |
| no | yes. scientific progress and knowledge enrichment | yes. religion |
| yes. religion | yes. from mainland to Taiwan | yes |
| yes | yes | yes |
| no | no | no |
| Yes-From Chinese cultural identity to Taiwanese cultural identity | Taiwan should be one body with the mainland. Both are Chinese people. But for the present | |

13. Changes to Cultural Identity Since 1986

| | | |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| | language, ethnicity | Taiwan is chaotic (luan), with competition for power and benefit without knowledge--it's not worth identifying with. Taipei's government should have a longer range plan (ideal) and objective. |
| 22. Chinese | Race | no |
| 23. Chinese | Race | no |
| 24. Taiwanese | Place, Language | none |
| 25. Chinese | blood relationship | none--I've always identified with Chinese culture. "Zhongguo" of course includes the two coasts. |
| 26. Chinese | hometown, native place | no change. |
| 27. Chinese | Race | yes, more united with cultural identity (racial) than before |
| 28. Chinese | Race, culture | no change |
| 29. Chinese | Family, education | a little--also am Taiwanese |
| 30. Waisheng | Language, Race | no change |
| 31. Taiwanese | Race, Place | Yes-support independence |
| 32. Chinese | Race | no change |
| 33. Taiwanese, Hakka | no answer | no answer |
| 34. Chinese, Hakka | Race | no change |
| 35. Ben-cheng | no answer | no answer |
| 36. Chinese | Race | no answer |
| 37. Chinese | Race | no change |
| 38. Taiwanese, bensheng | Native place | no answer |
| 39. Chinese | Race | Sense of belonging has become even stronger |
| 40. Taiwanese | language | Sense of belonging has changed |
| 41. Chinese | Native place | no change |
| 42. Chinese | Race | Because of information of a developing international viewpoint and because of unrestricted international communication in the world village, my understanding of Taiwan's position has become clearer. |
| 43. East Asian, Chinese, Taiwanese | Chinese (Zhonghua) race, native place, culture | yes, because of the loss of culture, we must search for and return to our native place culture |
| 44. Taiwanese | native place | no answer |
| 45. Taiwanese | Religion | no answer |
| 46. Taiwanese | Race | no change |
| 47. East Asian | Race | yes--[no explanation] |
| 48. Taiwanese | Guofu, (nation-state) | society, orderless have changed |
| 49. East Asian | Race | Sense of belonging |
| 50. Chinese, Taiwanese, waisheng | Race | no change |


Summary of Identity

| Self-Identity | Cultural Identity | | Changes to Cultural Identity |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| East Asian Only - 3 | Race Only - 21 | E. As. 4 | Yes - 22 |
| East Asian + - 2 | Race + - 2 "Blood Ties" - 1 | Chinese 21 Taiwanese 6 Hakka 2 Waisheng 2 | No - 19 No Answer - 9 |
| Chinese Only - 23 | Place Only - 8 | E. As. 1 | |
| <i>waisheng</i> - 1 | Place + - 5 | Chinese 5 | |
| Chinese + - 5 | | Taiwanese 8 | |
| <i>waisheng</i> + - 1 | | Province 1 | |
| Taiwanese Only - 15 | <i>Guojia</i> - 1 | Taiwanese | |
| <i>Bensheng</i> - 1 | | | |
| Taiwanese + - 3 | | | |
| Gaohsiung Province - 1 | Language Only - 4 | Chinese 3 | |
| | Language + - 3 | <i>Waisheng</i> 1 Taiwanese 4 Hakka 1 | |
| Hakka + - 3 | Religion - 2 | Chinese 1 | |
| | | Taiwanese 1 | |
| | Family - 1 | Chinese | |
| | "Feeling of Brotherhood" - 1 | Taiwanese | |

14. Cultural Identity Influences

| | media | party | family | religion | school | university | military | colleagues |
|----|-------|-------|--------|----------|--------|------------|----------|------------|
| 1 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| 2 | 8 | 3 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 10 |
| 3 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 9 |
| 4 | 10 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 5 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 8 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 9 | 6 | 5 | 10 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 1 |
| 10 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| 11 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| 12 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 4 |
| 13 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 1 |
| 14 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 15 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 2 |
| 16 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 17 | 5 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 5 |
| 18 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| 19 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
| 20 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | media | gov't | family | religion | education | colleagues |
|----|-------|-------|--------|----------|-----------|------------|
| 23 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 0 |
| 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 25 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| 26 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 4 |
| 27 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 6 |
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 29 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 5 |
| 30 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| 31 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 1 |
| 32 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 1 |
| 33 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| 34 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 9 | 6 |
| 35 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| 36 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| 37 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 6 |
| 38 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 10 | 7 |
| 39 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 7 |
| 40 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 4 |
| 41 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 42 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 5 |
| 43 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 5 |
| 44 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| 45 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 46 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 9 | 4 |
| 47 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 5 |
| 48 | 10 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 49 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 |
| 50 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 1 |





15. Legitimate representative of political tradition

| | Mainland | Taiwan | Both | Neither |
|-----|---|--------------------|--|--|
| 1. | Mainland because the harmonious characteristics of land and culture still exist | | | |
| 2. | | | Each have their own important points | |
| 3. | 1 | | | |
| 4. | | | Both. Though the imperial gov't has already passed, there still remains a remnant of ugly greed | |
| 5. | | | | no opinion |
| 6. | | | | no opinion |
| 7. | 1 | | | |
| 8. | | | 1 | |
| 9. | | | Taiwan best represents tradional Confucian thought and action, but the mainland is the direct sucessor of the land | |
| 10. | 1 | | | |
| 11. | | | | |
| 12. | | | Both are important | |
| 13. | | | | |
| 14. | | Taiwan is peaceful | | |
| 15. | | | | |
| 16. | | 1 | | |
| 17. | | | | |
| 18. | | | | |
| 19. | 1 | | | |
| 20. | 1 | | | |
| 21. | | | | This is a transitiona ! period. Neither are good enough to represent— they're both liars! |
| 22. | | | 1 | |
| 23. | | | 1 Both places' culture have good and bad points, I personally feel they can both | |

| | | | |
|-----|---|---|------------|
| 24. | | represent Chinese culture | no opinion |
| 25. | | 1 Taiwan's political history is different from the mainland--since the beginning of the move to Taiwan--both belong to "Zhongguo" so both represent [the political history and traditions]. | |
| 26. | | 1 | |
| 27. | | 1 | |
| 28. | | 1 | |
| 29. | | 1 | |
| 30. | | 1 | |
| 31. | | no answer | |
| 32. | 1 Because Taiwan strives toward or is particular about a spirit of benevolent government, helping the weak and poor, in the aspect of international exchange it's very active | | |
| 33. | 1 | | |
| 34. | 1 Because I was raised on Taiwan, receiving education that was influenced by Chinese history and tradition | | |
| 35. | 1 | | |
| 36. | 1 | | |
| 37. | 1 | | |
| 38. | | | no answer |
| 39. | | 1 | |
| 40. | | 1 | |

| | | | |
|-------|---|---|---|
| 41 | 1 | | |
| 42 | | 1 | |
| 43 | | 1 | |
| 44 | | | no answer |
| 45 | | 1 Both are representative, because they influence one another | |
| 46 | | 1 | |
| 47 | | 1 | |
| 48 | | 1 | |
| 49 | 1 | | |
| 50 | | | The mainland before 1949 represents the tradition, so neither right now—then histories are too short 2 (11 No Answer) |
| Total | 6 | 10 | 21 |


Legitimate Representative of Political Tradition



16. Which public institution best represents Chinese political history and tradition?

| | media | party | family | religion | school | university | military | mafia |
|----|-------|-------|--------|----------|--------|------------|----------|-------|
| 1 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 0 |
| 2 | 8 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 0 |
| 3 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 0 |
| 4 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 0 |
| 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 9 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| 10 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 1 |
| 11 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 |
| 12 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 10 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 10 |
| 13 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 1 |
| 14 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 15 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 3 |
| 16 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 17 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 18 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| 19 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 2 |
| 20 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 3 |
| 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |


| | media | gov't | family | religion | education | black society |
|----|-------|-------|--------|----------|-----------|---------------|
| 23 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 6 |
| 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 25 | 1 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 26 | 5 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 4 |
| 27 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| 28 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| 29 | 8 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 1 |
| 30 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 1 |
| 31 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 32 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 1 |
| 33 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| 34 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 1 |
| 35 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 36 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 37 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 1 |
| 38 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 4 |
| 39 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| 40 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 |
| 41 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 42 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 4 |
| 43 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 9 | 1 |
| 44 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 45 | 1 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 46 | 2 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 3 |
| 47 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 1 |
| 48 | 8 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 1 |
| 49 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 50 | 1 | 10 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 9 |



17. The world sees which as the legitimate successor to Chinese civilization?

| | Mainland | Taiwa n | Both | Neither |
|-----|---|------------|-----------|--|
| 1. | | 1 | | |
| 2. | | | | The world has no way to recognize a legitimate successor |
| 3. | 1 | | | |
| 4. | | 1 | | |
| 5. | | | equa l | |
| 6. | | | equa l | |
| 7. | 1 | | | |
| 8. | 1 | | | |
| 9. | 1 Because of the land mass, natural resources, national strength, legitimate ties | | | |
| 10. | 1 | | | |
| 11. | | 1 | | |
| 12. | 1 | | | |
| 13. | | | | 1 |
| 14. | | 1 | | |
| 15. | | | | |
| 16. | 1 | | | |
| 17. | | 1 | | |
| 18. | | | | Hard to say |
| 19. | 1 [supports ind., Taiwanese identity] | | | |
| 20. | 1 [supports ind., Taiwanese identity] | | | |
| 21. | 1 | | | |
| 22. | 1 But I don't agree that it should be this way, Taiwan should be recognized as a legitimate actor in world organizations | | | |
| 23. | 1 | | | |
| 24. | | | | no opinion |
| 25. | 1 | | | |
| 26. | 1 | | | |
| 27. | 1 | | | |
| 28. | 1 | | | |
| 29. | | | 1 | |
| 30. | 1 | | | |
| 31. | | | | no answer |
| 32. | | 1 | | |

| | | | | |
|-------|----|----|---|-------------------------|
| 33 | | 1 | | |
| 34 | | 1 | | |
| 35 | | 1 | | |
| 36 | | 1 | | |
| 37 | | 1 | | |
| 38 | | | | no answer |
| 39 | | 1 | | |
| 40 | 1 | | | |
| 41 | 1 | | | |
| 42 | 1 | | | |
| 43 | | | | no answer-question mark |
| 44 | | 1 | | |
| 45 | | 1 | | |
| 46 | 1 | | | |
| 47 | | 1 | | |
| 48 | | 1 | | |
| 49 | | 1 | | |
| 50 | 1 | | | |
| Total | 22 | 17 | 3 | 8 |




18. Independence, Unification, Status Quo

| | Independence | Unification | Status Quo | None of the above |
|----|--------------|--------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | | | 1 (but look for future unification) | |
| 2 | | | | 1 |
| 3 | | | 1 (short term) | |
| 4 | | step by step | | |
| 5 | | | 1 | |
| 6 | | | 1 | |
| 7 | | | 1 | |
| 8 | | | 1 | |
| 9 | | 1 | | |
| 10 | | | 1 | |
| 11 | | 1 | | |
| 12 | | | 1 | |

| | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 13. | | 1 |
| 14. | 1 | |
| 15. | | |
| 16. | 1 | |
| 17. | | 1 |
| 18. | Independence using peaceful means | |
| 19. | 1 | |
| 20. | 1 Feels that the present status is independent? | |
| 21. | | 1 |
| 22. | | 1 |
| 23. | | 1 |
| 24. | | 1 (peace) |
| 25. | | 1 |
| 26. | | 1 |
| 27. | | 1 |
| 28. | | 1 |
| 29. | | 1 |
| 30. | 1 | |
| 31. | 1 | |
| 32. | 1 | |
| 33. | 1 | |
| 34. | | 1 |
| 35. | | 1 (eventually unification) |
| 36. | 1 Taiwan is naturally a part of China | |
| 37. | | 1 (eventually unification) |
| 38. | | 1 |
| 39. | 1 Peaceful, Democratic system. Feels in her heart Taiwan is a part of China, an attitude mostly from her education | |
| 40. | | 1 (eventually unification, but peace is most important) |
| 41. | | 1 (peaceful unification eventually) |
| 42. | 1 (Perhaps a federation-- China has different ethnic groups, but like Europeans wanting to unite Europe, | |

| | | | |
|-------|----------------|---|--|
| | | China should unite. China is like a family, but not based on blood relationship—anyone can become a Zhongguo ren. | |
| 43. | | | 1 |
| 44. | 1 | | |
| 45. | | 1 | |
| 46. | | | 1 (peaceful unification, Taiwan is historically a part of China) |
| 47. | 1 (peacefully) | | |
| 48. | | | 1 (eventually independence, cultures are different) |
| 49. | 1 | | |
| 50. | | | 1 |
| Total | 10 | 9 | 29 |
| al | | | 1 |



Change in Public Opinion on Attitudes Toward Independence and Unification From Public Opinion Polls*

從民意測驗看台灣民衆的統獨輿論之變化


Chart 1

Comparison of Chinese Consciousness and Taiwanese Consciousness

| Emotional Attachment | Chinese Consciousness | Taiwanese Consciousness |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Recognition Ethnic Origin | All are <i>Huaren</i> 華人, also of the Han race | Identify with <i>Huaren</i> , but ancestors came to Taiwan 3-400 years ago have developed their own system. (Extremists advocate the theory of "Taiwanese Race/Ethnicity") |
| Native Place Attachment | Have feelings of homeland 家園 toward Taiwan, ancestral origins from the Mainland | Unfamiliar or strange toward the Mainland, "My China 中國 is on Taiwan" |
| National Territory Aspirations | Taiwan is a small island; yearn to become Chinese of a Greater China | Although Taiwan is small, it has everything required, and can develop towards the sea |
| Political Factor | KMT inherited the Chinese mainland legally constituted authority and legitimacy | The future of Taiwan ought to be decided by the 21 million people of Taiwan |
| Economic Factor | The Mainland consumer market is huge, the unification of the two coasts can provide a better future | Taiwan escaped the Mainland economic sphere 40 years ago and can self-exist |
| Cultural Factor | Except for the Taiwanese indigenous peoples, all follow Chinese culture | For 100 years Taiwan has received foreign culture and has gradually grown distant from the Mainland |
| Historical Recognition | Taiwan from ancient times has been a part of China, and is now a segment of China | During the Holland occupation, Ming Dynasty, and Japanese occupation, Taiwan was never under Chinese control. The Qing Dynasty gave up Taiwan, Taiwan should face reality, give up an "orphan" mentality and independently take responsibility for itself. |

* Translated from Liu Shengji, 劉勝基 "Change in Public Opinion on Attitudes Toward Independence and Unification From Public Opinion Polls," "從民意測驗看台灣民衆的統獨輿論之變化," p. 123

Chart 2
United Daily Poll Results on "Atmosphere of the Two Coast Relationship"



Mainland Affairs Commission Poll: Self-Identity as Taiwanese, Chinese, or Both

Chart 3
Summary Results




Chart 4
By Gender




Chart 5: By Age Group





Chart 6: By Place Origin



| Language Category | Elementary - Below (216) | Middle/High School (371) | College - Above (226) |
|-------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Taiwanese | 35% | 37% | 23% |
| Both | 38% | 55% | 57% |
| Chinese | 22% | 25% | 30% |
| No Answer | 2% | 9% | 5% |

| Occupation | Taiwanese (%) | Both (%) | Chinese (%) | No Answer (%) |
|--------------------------------|---------------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| Military/Police/Public Service | 13 | 48 | 37 | 1 |
| Business Owners | 25 | 55 | 25 | 2 |
| Service Industry | 27 | 42 | 28 | 4 |
| Farming/Fishing | 29 | 62 | 26 | 2 |
| Worker | 18 | 72 | 26 | 7 |
| Self-Employed | 25 | 50 | 21 | 1 |
| Student | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Homemakers | 25 | 1 | 1 | 10 |

Chart 9: By Party Affiliation




Chart 10
Democratic Progressive Party "Taiwan, Chinese, or Dual Identity"




Chart 11
United Daily Poll Results on "Self-Identity as Taiwanese or Chinese"




Chart 12: Mainland Affairs Commission "Taiwanese People's Opinion Toward Independence/Unification"




Chart 13: Mainland Affairs Commission "Taiwanese People's Opinion Toward Independence/Unification"




Chart 14
Mainland Affairs Commission "Do You Support Taiwan Independence?"




Chart 15: DPP Survey "Do You Agree/Disagree with the PRC Government Statement 'Unification is the Desire of People On Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits'?"




Chart 16
Gallup Poll: "Do You Support Taiwanese Independence?"






Chart 17
United Daily Poll: "Do You Support Taiwanese Independence?"



■ Strongly Support
 ■ Moderately Support
 □ Moderately Don't Support
 □ Strongly Don't Support

| 90/10/09 | 91/09/19 | 91/10/19 | 92/10/15 | 93/03/17 | 93/08/09 | 94/04/17 | 94/07/07 |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 7 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 18 | 19 |
| 14 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 10 | 24 | 17 |
| 28 | 20 | 22 | 23 | 23 | 20 | 21 | 19 |
| 29 | 34 | 36 | 28 | 26 | 31 | 16 | 23 |




■ Total Support
 ■ Total Don't Support

Chart 18
United Daily Poll: "Do You Support the Unification of Taiwan and the Mainland?"



■ Strongly Don't Support
 ■ Moderately Don't Support
 □ Moderately Support
 □ Strongly Support

| 90/10/09 | 91/09/19 | 91/10/19 | 92/10/15 | 93/03/17 | 93/08/09 | 94/04/17 | 94/07/07 |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 15 | 15 |
| 7 | 10 | 5 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 19 | 17 |
| 33 | 19 | 22 | 26 | 25 | 21 | 28 | 17 |
| 33 | 34 | 34 | 33 | 25 | 28 | 16 | 17 |



■ Total Don't Support
 ■ Total Support

Chart 19: United Daily Poll: "Do You Support Taiwanese Independence, Unification, or Continue the Present Situation?"





Chart 20: China Times Poll: "Do You Support Taiwanese Independence, Unification, or Continue the Present Situation?"



Robert Lee Cummings Jr.

李柯明

561-0304

訪問問題

Sir/Ma'am,

I am a US Air Force Officer finishing a tour at the US Air Force Academy. Before I go back to flying air refueling jets, I am here in Taiwan developing my language skills and also doing some research into Taiwanese cultural identity and the Taiwanese Independence Movement. I have spent some time randomly interviewing Taiwanese people, and I would like to ask you related questions about political attitudes, cultural identity, and political legitimacy. I would also appreciate your comments on what I've found so far from talking to people on the streets of Taipei. Following are the questions I would like to discuss. Attached is also my survey that I've been taking. I graciously thank you for the opportunity to discuss this topic.

先生，

我是一位美國軍官在空軍軍官官校教書。我在那邊的工作快要結束，

但是再去開飛機以前來台灣讀書和研究台灣文化認同和台獨運動。

我最近在路上訪問了台灣各種的人也想問你跟政治態度，文化認同，和政治合法有關的問題。我藍w迎A對我的民意調查批評指教。下面就是我想跟你討論的問題，還有我的民意調查。
非常感謝您。

Personal Background個人的 來歷

1. May I ask what is your personal background--where are you from, where is your family from, how did you come to get involved in politics and the Legislative Yuan?

請問你個人的 來歷？ 請問您在哪裏成長
的？您爸爸媽媽是哪一省人？您怎麼進入政治生涯？

Political Attitudes政治態度

2. What do you feel your most important responsibility is as a legislator? What do you feel are the responsibilities and roles of government in general? What do you think the voters expect from government?

您當立法者覺得你個人最重要的責任是什麼？一般而言政府最重要的責任是什麼？您
您覺得選舉人對政府有什麼期待要求？

3. What do you think most influences your constituents political attitudes?

對你來說你代表的選舉人的政治態度受什麼影響？

Cultural Identity文化認同

4. Do you personally see yourself first as East Asian, Chinese, Taiwanese, belonging to your province or other? How do you think your constituents would answer this question?

您把自己首先看作東方人，中國人，台灣人，或著別的？

Is it possible to distinguish between Chinese culture and Taiwanese culture?

中國文化跟台灣文化有什麼分別？

What are the sources and influences for cultural identity for Taiwanese and Mainlanders?
台灣和中國文化認同的來源是什麼，受到什麼影響？ Please talk specifically about the media's role and the role of education in establishing cultural identity.
請您說媒體和教育的角色。 What characteristics typify Taiwanese and Mainlanders?
台灣人和大陸人有什麼特色？

Cultural Identity Changes 文化認同變化

5. Has the cultural identity of Taiwan's people changed since political opening in 1986? If so, how? What do you see as future trends? 台灣人文化認同從1986年以來有沒有改變？怎樣？對您來說將來會有什麼趨勢？

Cultural and Political Relationship 文化和政治關係

6. What is China? 中國兩個字到底是什麼意思？

Is it a modern nation-state under one government, a culture, a specific place?

是屬於一個政府的現代國家嗎？文化？地方？

What do most Taiwanese think of when they think of a nation?

對一般的台灣人來講國家兩個字到底是什麼意思？

Would most consider a nation to be based on ethnicity? 大部分會不會認為是跟民族有關係？

Can Chinese *culture* be regarded separately from a Taiwanese *state*?

大部分會不會分別中國文化跟台灣國家？ Who should decide this question—should Taiwan's status be decided by all Chinese? 對這個問題誰應該有決定權利？

Political Legitimacy 政治合法

7. Is Taiwanese society or Mainland society most representative of China's political history and traditions? 台灣還是大陸最能代表中國政治歷史和傳統？

What public institutions best represent China's history and traditions? 哪個公共團體最能代表中國的政治歷史和傳統？

Who do most people see as the legitimate successor to Chinese civilization?

對一般台灣人來講哪個國家是中國文明正統的繼承者？

Who do most Taiwanese think the world recognizes as the legitimate successor of Chinese civilization? 大部分的台灣人會想世界會以台灣或者大陸為中國文明正統的繼承者？

民意調查

| | | |
|--|----------------|--|
| 1. 性別：女 <input type="checkbox"/> 男 <input type="checkbox"/> | 2. 年齡： | 3. 已婚 <input type="checkbox"/> 未婚 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. 教育程度：國中 <input type="checkbox"/> 高中 <input type="checkbox"/> 專科 <input type="checkbox"/> 大學 <input type="checkbox"/> 碩士 <input type="checkbox"/> 博士 <input type="checkbox"/> | 5. 現在的職業： | |
| 6. 請問您在哪裏成長的？ | 7. 您爸爸媽媽是哪一省人？ | |

8. 您覺得政府最重要的責任是什麼？請您在下面線用·X·來排列。

| | 不太重要 | | | | ⇒ | | | | | 很重要 |
|---------|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----|
| 支持個人自由 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 保護社會秩序 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 國防 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 提供全民福利 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 使增進經濟發展 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

9. 您的政治態度受什麼影響？

| | 沒有影響 | | | | ⇒ | | | | | 很大的影響 |
|----|------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| 媒體 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 政府 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 家庭 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 宗教 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 教育 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 老板 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 同事 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

10. 您把自己首先看作：☐東方人，☐中國人，☐台灣人，☐外省人，☐本省人，☐客家人，或著☐別的？

11. 對您來說您文化認同最大的來源是什麼？例如，是家鄉，方言，宗教，民族等？

12. 從1986年以來，您的文化認同有沒有改變(例如，歸屬感)？如改變的話，什麼樣的改變，為什麼？

13. 您的文化認同態度從哪裏受到影響？

| | 沒有影響 | | | | ⇒ | | 很大的影響 | | | |
|----|------|---|---|---|---|---|-------|---|---|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 媒體 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 政府 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 家庭 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 宗教 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 教育 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 同事 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

14. 對您來講，☐台灣，☐大陸，☐兩個都是☐無一個 最能的代表中國政治歷史和傳統？為什麼？

15. 哪個公共團體最能代表中國的政治歷史和傳統？

| | 不代表 | | | | ⇒ | | 真正代表 | | | |
|-----|-----|---|---|---|---|---|------|---|---|----|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 媒體 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 政府 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 家庭 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 宗教 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 教育 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 黑社會 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

16. 您想世界會以☐台灣或者☐大陸為中國文明正統的繼承者？

17. 您最支持哪個政黨？為什麼？

18. 您贊成☐台灣獨立，☐統一，還是☐維持現況？

Opinion Survey

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 1 ° Sex : F <input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 ° Age : | 3 ° Married <input type="checkbox"/> Single <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4 ° ed level : middle school <input type="checkbox"/> high school <input type="checkbox"/> college <input type="checkbox"/> university <input type="checkbox"/> masters <input type="checkbox"/> doctor <input type="checkbox"/> | 5 ° Occupation: | |
| 6 ° Where were you raised? | 7 ° What province are your parents from? | |

8 ° What do you feel is the most important responsibility of government?

| | not important | | | | | ⇒ | very important | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------|---|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|----|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| supporting individual freedom | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| protecting societal order | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| national defense | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| raise the people's welfare | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| push for economic development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |

9 ° What influences your political attitude ?

| | no influence | | | | | ⇒ | large influence | | | | |
|------------|--------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|---|---|----|--|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| media | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| gov't | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| family | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| religion | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| education | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| boss | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
| colleagues | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |

10 ° Do you first see yourself as : ☐ East Asian ☐ Chinese ☐ Taiwanese ☐ waisheng ☐ bensheng ☐ Hakka ☐ other?

11 ° According to you , what is the greatest source of your cultural identity? For example, hometown, language, religion, race?

12 ° From 1986, has your cultural identity changed? (for example, your sense of belonging?) If it's changed, how and why?

13 ° What influences your cultural identity?

| | no influence | | | | ⇒ | | | | | large influence |
|------------|--------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|
| media | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| gov't | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| family | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| religion | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| education | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| colleagues | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

14 ° According to you , ☐ Taiwan , ☐ Mainland, ☐ both ☐ neither most represent Chinese political history and tradition. Why?

15 ° Which public institution best represents Chinese political history and traditions?

| | doesn't represent | | | | ⇒ | | | | | most accurately represents |
|-----------------|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------------------------|
| media | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| gov't | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| family | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| religion | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| education | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| "Black Society" | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

16 ° Do you think the world sees ☐Taiwan or☐Mainland as the legitimate successor to Chinese civilization?

17 ° Which party do you most support? Why?

18 ° Do you support ☐Taiwanese independence ☐ unification or ☐ support the present situation?

CRISIS IN THE STRAITS:

An Analysis of the Taiwan Straits Situation

Outline

- Geographic, Economic and Historical Context
- Recent Developments: Taiwanese Democracy, Chinese Nationalism
- Purpose of PRC Intimidation
- Effects of PRC Intimidation
- US Policy Considerations

Taiwan Geography

- 245 X 90 MI
- Straits 60 - 100 MI wide
- 21.5 Million
- 84% Taiwanese
- 14% Mainland Chinese
- 2% aborigine
- Controls 1/2 off SE coast of Mainland

Taiwan Economy

- Free-Market Capitalist Economy
- GNP avg growth 9% over last 30 yrs
- Per Capita GNP, 1994 - \$12,070 (est. \$2,500 for PRC)
- US' 6th largest trading partner
- US exported \$17 billion to Taiwan , (\$8.8 billion to PRC), 1994
- 2nd Largest Holder of Foreign Reserves


Historical Context

- 1644-1895 Ch'ing Control
- 1895-1945 Japanese Colonization
- 1949 Nationalist Arrival
- 1954 US - ROC Security Pact
- 1958 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis
- 1971 Loss of UN Seat
- 1979 US De-recognition
- 1987 Martial Law Ends
- 1988 Lee Teng-hui President
- 1990 Lee Elected by National Assembly
- 1991 Taiwan Ends "Rebellion Suppression" Mobilization

Economic and Social Changes, 1952-1990

- Labor Shift
 - 56.1% to 12.9% in primary sector
 - 12.4% to 32% in manufacture
- Education
 - Illiteracy from 42.1% to less than 7%
 - 57% of 16+ yr olds completed secondary
- Income

- 1991 Over US \$8,800 per capita
- Internationalization of Economy
- Experience in Electoral Politics
- Explosion in Civic Organizations



Summary of Trends in PRC-ROC Relationship

Unification

- Common Ethnic Heritage
- Trade & Investment
\$20-30 billion direct investment

Separation

- Democracy Vs Autocracy
- Prosperity Vs Poverty
- Pluralism Vs Repression
- Taiwanese Nationalism

Positions on Unification and Taiwan's Status

PRC: One China - Two Systems

- "Taiwan is a part of China and its leaders are only leaders of a region of China." Li Peng, 1996
- Use of force not forsworn

KMT: One China - Two Governments

- "The Republic of China is an independent and sovereign nation." Lee Teng-hui, 1990
- Unification Criteria:
 - Democracy
 - Economic Development
 - Freedom (human rights)

DPP: One China, One Taiwan

Military Situation

PRC Versus ROC Forces, Army

| | | |
|--------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Armed Forces | 2.93 mil, 1.2 res | 468k regulars |
| Army | 2.2 million | 290k (inc. mil. police) |
| Weapons | ~8,000 main tanks | 570 main tanks |
| | ~2,000 lt tanks | 905 light tanks |
| | 4,500 APCs | 950 APCs |
| | 14,500 towed artillery | 1,060 towed artillery |

PRC-ROC Naval Forces

| | | |
|---------|---|-------------------------------|
| Navy | 260K | 68K |
| Weapons | 52 subs (4 kilo) | 4 subs |
| | 18 destroyers | 22 destroyers |
| | 32 frigates | 16 frigates |
| | 870 patrol, coastal combatants | Hsiung Feng, |
| | 18 assault ships (10 tanks or 200 troops) | Harpoon anti- |
| | | ship |
| | | ASROC anti-sub |
| | | 98 patrol, coastal combatants |

PRC-ROC Air Forces

| | | |
|-----------|--|---|
| Air Force | 470k | 68k |
| Weapons | 4,970 combat (some poss. nuclear) | 430 combat 275 F-5 50 F-104 40 IDF |
| Missiles | 17 ICBM launchers 70 IRBM 1 SLBM M9 SSM (600 km) M8 SSM (150 km) | Nike Hercules Hawk |

Military Summary

- PRC Weapons, Doctrine Outdated
- ROC Weapons More Modern
- Intricacies of Amphibious Assault on Prepared Positions in Limited Area
- Future:
- PRC - Navy Modernization, SU-27
- ROC - Anti-missile, F-16, Mirage, French Frigates

Recent Political Developments

- Jun 95, Lee Visits US
 - 1995 Legis. Elections
 - KMT 85 (-11)
 - DPP 54 (+4)
 - New 21 (+14)
 - Ind 4
- KMT rcv'd 46% of total vote, 51.8% of seats

PRC Political Situation

- Succession Struggle
- Growing Influence of Military
- Economic Development and Regional Autonomy
- Nationalism as the Solution

Taiwanese Presidential Election

- Candidates
 - Lee Teng-hui Incumbent, Status Quo
 - Peng Ming-min DPP, Pro-Independence
 - Lin Yang-kang Taiwanese, Pro-Unif.
 - Chen Li-An Buddhist, Anti-KMT
- Issues
- Conduct of Candidates

Presidential Election Results

Lee, KMT - 54%
Peng, DPP - 21%
Lin, New - 15%
Chen, Ind - 10%

- Mandate for Status Quo
- Negotiation, Continued Int'l Presence
- "My aim is to preserve national dignity and firmly establish our place in the world." - Lee Teng-hui Post-Election Speech

PRC Military Exercises

PRC Objectives in Military Exercises

- National Strategy: Great Power Status
- Influence/Disrupt Election
- Anti-independence message
- Force Post-election
- Negotiation
- Example to PRC
- Coastal Provinces
- Strengthen Jiang's Position With Military

Effects of PRC Intimidation

External

- Higher Voter Turn-out (~76%)
- More support for incumbent, strong leader
- Increased Taiwanese support for Independence
- Reinforced Taiwanese negative image of PRC
- Foreign sales, domestic military budget increase
- Brought World attention/concern
- Invited US involvement, solidified US commitment
- Proved missile capability, PRC commitment

Internal


- Strengthened Jiang's standing with military
- Gave training, confidence, *esprit* to Red Army
- Stirred nationalist reaction of people
- Served notice to Fujian, other provinces
- Demonstrates/justifies need for further offensive capability development and spending

The US Policy

- Cold War Complications
- 1979 De-Recognition and Taiwan Relations Act
- Taiwan Relations Act

US Policy "to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern"

Act also "make(s) clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."



- US-PRC Communiqué
- Reaction to Current Crisis
 - Carriers will remind China that US "is the strongest military power in the western Pacific." - Defence Secretary William Perry
- The Delicate Balance
- Clear Intentions
 - "The White House should state clearly . . . that if Taiwan declares independence, count us out; if China invades, count us in." - James Shinn, NYT editorial
 - "I would recommend that if Taiwan unequivocally decides that it wants to be an independent nation, and completely free of any control or domination or idea of reunifying with China, that that would be a decision we would respect. And if that involves a change of American policy, so be it." - Former Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger
- Taiwan as a model of economic-political development
 - "The reality is we ought to treat China and Taiwan like we did West Germany and East Germany." Sen. Paul Simon (D-IL)

Conclusion

- Divergence
- Nationalism
- PRC Changes
- US Responses

The Asian Studies Group is a group of scholars and interested parties dedicated to promoting Asian Studies at the United States Air Force Academy and in the Air Force. If you'd like to join, or learn more, please contact Capt Cummings.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Pro-independence legislator Lin Chu-shui remarked that Taiwanese should learn to call themselves *Huayi* "華裔" instead of the currently common *Zhongguo ren* "中國人" in order to distinguish between racial, cultural and political identification.
- ² Further consideration might be given to economic and military elite elements, but such is beyond the scope of this report. I have included, however, in the appendix section, an outline of a presentation that I made concerning the spring crisis in the Taiwan Straits over the presidential elections. In that outline I have provided some numbers on the economy and military.
- ³ The following general historical account comes from various sources; several good accounts may be found in John F. Copper's *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, and Leonard H. D. Gordon, editor, *Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
- ⁴ Cooper, p. 28.
- ⁵ Cooper, p. 30.
- ⁶ Cooper, p. 36.
- ⁷ Michael Chang, of Academia Sinica's Sociology Institute, emphasized this point and provided some of the background information here.
- ⁸ "The Charter of the Kuo Min Tang of China," Article II, in Department of Cultural Affairs of the Central Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, ed., *Getting to Know the KMT: The Nationalist Party of China* (Taipei: China Cultural Services Co., Ltd., 1989), vol. 2, p. B-4.
- ⁹ Thomas B. Gold, "Taiwan's Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China," in *In the Shadow of China*, Tsang, Steve. *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan Since 1949*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993, pp. 177-179.
- ¹⁰ Mark S. Pratt, "US Reactions to the PRC Use of Force" in *If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait*, Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater eds. by pp. 35-54
- ¹¹ My translation of Liu Sheng-chi 劉勝旗, "從民意測驗看台灣民衆的統獨輿論之變化," "Change to Taiwan People's Public Opinion as Seen from Public Opinion Surveys," 東亞季刊, *East Asian Quarterly* 民國八十五年春季, Spring, 1996, p. 132.
- ¹² Ralph N. Clough, *Reaching Across the Strait: People to People Diplomacy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p. 152.
- ¹³ Just recently, Vincent Siew, chairman of Taiwan's cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council, reiterated this abandonment of of legitimacy over Mainland China: "we have already given up the fight for orthodoxy, legitimacy and the rights to represent China. Until mainland China gives up its hostility towards Taiwan and its threats of force, we can't safely pursue unification. Our fundamental concern is our national security and dignity. If we lack national security, the goal of national unification can't be realized." Julian Baum, "Frankly Speaking: Pragmatism Increasingly Determines China Policy," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), 15 Jun 95, p. 24
- ¹⁴ Cooper, p. 44.
- ¹⁵ Cooper, p. 156.
- ¹⁶ Linda Gail Arrigo, "From Democratic Movement to Bourgeois Democracy: The Internal Politics of the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party in 1991," in *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 156.
- ¹⁷ Cooper, p. 157.
- ¹⁸ Clough, p. 159.
- ¹⁹ Arrigo, however, says "The results overall had little to do with nationalism, either Taiwanese or Chinese, or with the role of the National Assembly as framer of the constitution. . . . the election was really a victory for "gold cows," moneyed interests. p. 152
- ²⁰ Arrigo, p. 157.

- ²¹ Arrigo, p. 158.
- ²² Arrigo, p. 161
- ²³ Mark N. Gose, "The Role of the Military in Building Political Community: The Case of the Two German States," University of Colorado, Department of Political Science doctoral dissertation, 1995, p. 4.
- ²⁴ Gose, pp. 6-8.
- ²⁵ Gose, p. 32.
- ²⁶ Gose, pp. 12-13.
- ²⁷ Gose, p. 14, from G. A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, editors, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- ²⁸ Gose, p. 34 from Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, Reno, Las Vegas, London: University of Nevada Press, 1991, p. 9.
- ²⁹ Gose, p. 35.
- ³⁰ Lucian W. Pye, exploring the Asian economic miracle in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Feb 94.
- ³¹ Alan M. Wachman, "Competing Identities in Taiwan," in *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 17.
- ³² Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1982, pp. 264-265.
- ³³ Gose, p. 38.
- ³⁴ Gose, p. 48.
- ³⁵ Arrigo, p. 172.
- ³⁶ Joseph Bosco, "Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics," in *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 118.
- ³⁷ Bosco, p. 120.
- ³⁸ Bosco, p. 136-139.
- ³⁹ Bosco, p. 139.
- ⁴⁰ Thomas A. Metzger, *The Unification of China and the Problem of Public Opinion in the Republic of China*, Stanford University: Hoover Institution, 1992, p. 3.
- ⁴¹ Alan M. Wachman, "Competing Identities in Taiwan," in *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 17. This article summarizes the points in his book *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization*. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.
- ⁴² Wachman p. 60.
- ⁴³ Wachman, p. 62.
- ⁴⁴ Gold, p. 175.
- ⁴⁵ Confucius emphasized that a true noble man, rather than be born into the position as implied by the previously common usage, had to earn the title through virtuous conduct.
- ⁴⁶ Arrigo, p. 148.
- ⁴⁷ My translation of Wu Nai-teh (吳乃德), "省籍意識，政治支持和國家認同" "Provincial Consciousness, Political Support and National Identity" 在張茂桂Michael Chang, editor, 族群關係與國家認同, *Ethnic Relationships and National Identity*, Taiwan: Chang Yung-fa Foundation, Institute for National Policy Research, n.d., p. 44.
- ⁴⁸ Wachman, in *The Other Taiwan*, p. 29.
- ⁴⁹ Wu, p. 47.
- ⁵⁰ Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, "Normative Conflicts in Contemporary Taiwan," Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Paper to be published in "Normative Conflicts: The Frontier of Social Cohesion" by Bertelsmann Science Foundation (Germany) and the "Club of Rome," p. 17.
- ⁵¹ Wu, p. 48.
- ⁵² My translation of Chiang Hsueh-ying (姜雪影), 台灣人快樂嗎? "Are Taiwanese Happy?" , 天下雜誌 *Tianhsia Magazine* 1994 , 2月1日 February 1st, 1994, 51 , 53頁 pp. 51, 53.
- ⁵³ The poll also investigates what respondents feel is "success," the majority answering family (as opposed to individual) welfare.

⁵⁴ FBIS, 20 Nov 95, p. 90.

⁵⁵ Clough, p. ?

⁵⁶ FBIS 29 Nov 95 "Covert Independence Movement Justifies Invasion"

⁵⁷ Julian Baum, "Pressure Cooker," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 Aug 95, pp. 16-7.

⁵⁸ Metzger, pp. 5, 6.

⁵⁹ Metzger, p. 12.

⁶⁰ Metzger, pp. 12-13.

⁶¹ Kenneth Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy" *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 95.

⁶² Mark S. Pratt, "US Reactions to the PRC Use of Force," Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater eds., *If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait*, p. 42.